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Abstract
In this Article, we explore a central problem facing creative
industries: how to organize collaborative creative production. We
argue that informal rules are a significant and pervasive—but
nonetheless underappreciated—tool for solving the problem. While
existing literature has focused on how informal rules sustain
incentives for producing creative work, we demonstrate how such
rules can facilitate and organize collaboration in the creative space.
We also suggest that informal rules can be a better fit for creative
organization than formal law. On the one side, unique features of
*
Professor of Law and Mark Claster Mamolen Teaching Scholar, the University of
Chicago Law School. I thank the Richard Weil Faculty Research Fund and the Paul H.
Leffmann Fund for generous research support.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
We thank Douglas Baird, Caroline Bradley, Michael Carroll, Dave Fagundes, Jeanne
Fromer. Brian Frye, Pat Gudridge, M. Todd Henderson, Lili Levi, GregMandel, Rob Merges,
Zahr Said, Stephen Schnably, Katherine Strandburg, and participants at the 2014 FSU
Junior IP Workshop, the NYU Innovation Policy Colloquium, the 2015 Works-in-Progress
Intellectual Property Colloquium, and the University of Miami Legal Theory Workshop for
helpful comments and discussions. Jasm ina Vajzovic and Joshua Williams provided excellent
research assistance.

1793

1794

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1793

creativity, especially high uncertainty and low verifiability, lead to
organizational challenges that formal law cannot easily address, as
demonstrated by recent high profile cases like Garcia v. Google, Inc.
On the other side, certain informal rules can meet these challenges
and facilitate organization. These informal rules, functioning
through mechanisms like reputation and trust, can sustain organiza
tional solutions without a manager, a hierarchical firm, or formal
allocation of control rights. In addition to showing how informal
rules can work without (much) formal law, we also sketch out the
dynamics involved in more complex cases where informal rules
function alongside formal law in organizing collaborative creativity.
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I n t r o d u c t io n

Creative production regularly requires th e combination of
m ultiple inputs. A film, for example, will combine writing, acting,
set design, costume production, editing, and the like. These creative
inputs m ust be organized, and th a t organization includes decisions
over who controls the inputs and the final output. This raises our
central question: how is collaborative creative production organized?
Recent high profile cases, like Garcia v. Google, Inc.1and 16 Casa
Duse, LLC v. M erkin,2 highlight the challenge of answ ering this
question. Both cases grappled w ith th e question of how much
control an in p u t provider had over the use of a specific input, and
thus over the end product th a t contained the input.3 The opinions
in these cases raised more questions th a n they answ ered regarding
w hat it m eans to be an author for purposes of copyright law, w hat
it m eans to control a creative work, and even w hat m akes a
particular work creative.4
The hypothesis we explore in this Article is th a t a complex set of
informal rules, operating through m echanism s like reputation and
tru st, regulates the behavior of creative collaborators throughout
the creative industries.5 These collaborations feature unobservable
and unverifiable inputs producing nonallocable and uncertain
outputs th a t formal law is ill equipped to regulate.6 When disputes
arise, courts force rigid concepts from formal copyright law onto the
flexible and messy reality of creative collaboration.7 Courts struggle
to decide these cases because formal law lacks th e capacity to deal
w ith the characteristics of creative collaborations. At best, those
courts create elaborate fictions to mimic inform al norms; a t worst,
they get things completely wrong, potentially underm ining the
informal norm s otherw ise required for creative collaboration to
operate in the ordinary course.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015).
See Merkin, 791 F.3d at 256; Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra P art III.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part FV.C.
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The significant and pervasive role that informal rules play in
organizing creative collaboration means that copyright theory must
account for the dynamics of informal rules in order to reach an
accurate understanding of how to allocate control of creative
production. 8 But copyright theorists have not fully appreciated the
role actually played by informal rules. To be sure, others have
recognized that informal rules sustain incentives for creative
production in “negative spaces”—such as cuisine, stand-up comedy,
and tattoos—where copyright protection is unavailable . 9 But such
accounts provide an incomplete description of the influence of
informal rules on creativity.
8. See infra P art II.C.
9. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?
Evidence from Innovation in IP ’s Negative Space, in 1 Research Handbook ON THE
E conomics of I ntellectual P roperty Law (Peter Menell & Ben Depoorter eds.,
forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, When Are IP Rights
Necessary?],https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838555 [https://perma.cc/53RA-RGWD] (summarizing
“negative space studies [that] have documented the powerful role social norms play in
stimulating innovation and constraining appropriation”). Copyright may be unavailable for
various reasons: legal doctrine may limit its scope; litigation costs may make enforcement
impractical; or community preferences that operate outside of the conventional legal system
may dominate behavior. Cf. Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces:
Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be PerSe Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO A rts & E nt . L.J. 1121,
1130-32 (2007) (challenging existing explanations, based on doctrinal limitations, for the lack
of protection for novel cuisine); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based
Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 Org . S c i . 187, 191 (2008) (noting
the absence of effective copyright law in the relationships among haute cuisine chefs in
France); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94
Va . L. R ev . 1787, 1790 (2008) (exploring the lack of “a cost effective way [for comics to]
protect[ ] the essence of their creativity”); Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos <6 IP Norms, 98 Min n .
L. R ev . 511,567-68 (2013) (setting out the challenges to legal protection for tattoos). The new
consensus is that, in these marginal “negative spaces” of intellectual property, informal rules
support creative production. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Properly in Fashion Design, 92 Va . L. R ev. 1687, 1769-75 (2006)
[hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox] (cataloging potential negative
spaces); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & Arts 317,
322-23 (2011). Although in most negative spaces informal rules limit appropriation, the
fashion industry stands as a possible example in which creative production might flourish
even with free appropriation. Compare Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra, at
1717-34, and Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Response, The Piracy Paradox
Revisited, 61 S tan . L. R ev . 1201 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy
Paradox Revisited], with C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics
of Fashion, 61 Stan . L. Rev . 1147 (2009), and C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, Reply, Remix
and Cultural Production, 61 Stan . L. R ev . 1227 (2009) [hereinafter Hemphill & Suk, Remix
and Cultural Production].
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We build on th is literatu re in two ways, expanding the u n d er
standing of where inform al rules operate and w hat inform al rules
can do. Inform al rules in fact cover everything from how producers
and directors decide w hen a film is finished,10 to how coauthors
share ideas,*11 to how m usicians choose band m ates.12 In this way,
inform al rules regulate the organization of film, th eater, music,
television, and publishing. These are not negative spaces on
copyright’s periphery.13 Inform al rules dom inate industries a t the
core of copyright’s domain, proving essential to creative production
because they are the key m echanism shaping the organization of
collaborative creative work.
This im pact of inform al rules on all kinds of collaborative creative
production m akes urgent the need to understand how they interact,
and potentially conflict, w ith formal law .14 Otherwise, statutory
grants of ow nership or judicial interpretations of formal copyright
law can interfere w ith long established norm s of creative collabora
tion in complex and unforeseen ways. U nderstanding how this
interaction plays out is therefore crucial to a coherent theory of
copyright law. And cases like Garcia and M erkin will only make
sense once th a t understanding is in h a n d .15
O ur analysis connects an extensive academic literatu re on
organizational theories—w ith a focus on theories of firms and
team s—to the emerging literatu re on informal rules in intellectual
property (IP).16
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part 11.A.
12. Cf. infra note 121 and accompanying text.
13. See Raustiala & Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?, supra note 9 (manuscript
at 3) (contrasting IP’s negative space with “IP’s positive space,” which “encompasses all those
creative activities that IP law addresses, such as novels, poems, films, television shows,
music, software, painting, and video games”); Rosenblatt, supra note 9, at 324-25 (defining
the idea of negative spaces); see also Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 199 (arguing
that norm-based IP systems arise where formal law is “inadequate or unsatisfactory”); Oliar
& Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1789-90 (arguing that copyright law is inadequate to protect the
work of stand-up comics); Perzanowski, supra note 9, at 569-70 (describing cultural aversion
in tattooing to formal law that renders reliance on copyright law unacceptable).
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. We forge new ground in revealing the importance of informal rules for organizing
collaborative creation in the copyright space. For work exploring adjacent areas involving
informal rules and private ordering in the use and production of information, see Yochai
Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How S ocial P roduction Transforms Markets and
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By linking these two literatures, we develop the novel hypothesis
that i n f o r m a l rules are the primary driver behind the organization
of collaborative creative production. 17 The IP-and-organizational
theory literature has focused primarily on the influence of formal
law rather than informal rules on the organization of creative
production. 18 The IP-norms literature has focused on the influence
of informal rules on incentives rather than organization,19 To bridge
this divide, we explain how informal rules, enforced through
mechanisms like reputation and trust, directly affect how creators
organize their collaborative activity. 20
The result is a form of network or community governance,
suggesting the futility of copyright law’s obsessive attempts at tying
together authorship, ownership, and control. 21 For whatever the law
tells us about copyright ownership, the facts on the ground may tell
us something quite different about who controlled and created a
work. Formal rules might be designed to cleanly allocate ownership
FREEDOM 100-03 (2006) (exploring organization of modular inputs in creativity); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 Vand . L. R ev . 1161, 1163-64 (2000) (applying transaction cost theories to
explain how formal law affects private ordering solutions to problems facing creative
collaborations); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177, 180 (1987) (exploring the interaction between the
formal law of patents and scientific sharing norms); David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me:
Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 T ex . L. R ev . 1093, 1097
(2012) (providing a nonlegal centralist account of a trademark-like governance system,
dependent on informal rules, that supports nonmarket production of intangible goods);
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 Geo . L.J. 49,
52-53 (2006) (describing how norms facilitate use of attribution to overcome information
asymmetries regarding individuals’ human capital); Brett M. Frischmann et al., Governing
Knowledge Commons, in Governing Knowledge Commons 1, 28-32 (Brett M. Frischmann
et al. eds., 2014); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural En
vironment, 95 Cornell L. R ev . 657, 698-704 (2010); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. R ev . 77, 79-80
(1999) (studying the influence of informal rules on interteam collaboration in the production
of science); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal
Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 18-20 (Nov. 13, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=661543 [https://perma.cc/V947-PJGL] (describing
nonstate institutional solutions to appropriability problems in the production of technical
information).
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.A
20. See infra Part ILL
21. See infra Part III.B.
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on the assum ption th a t control travels w ith ownership; inform al
rules may nonetheless adapt to fru strate those designs and allocate
control wherever the creative community sees fit.22 Form al law th a t
overrides those norms and forcibly consolidates control (if th a t is
even possible) will have dram atic and unforeseen effects on the
netw ork of creative production.
In developing this theory, we also explore th e potential downsides
to informal rules. For example, inform al rules can introduce bias
into decisions where formal law m ight be more even-handed.23
These concerns are particularly relevant in light of the recent and
well-publicized gender and racial disparities in opportunities and
pay in the film, television, and other creative industries.24
Finally, we sketch out the landscape of potential interactions
among formal law, informal rules, and th e organization of creative
collaborative production.25 In some instances, informal rules m ight
su b stitu te for formal law; if copyright law leaves an area largely
unregulated (as is the case for im provisational comedy),26 informal
rules m ay act alone to support creative collaboration.27 In other
instances, formal law and informal rules may be complements. In
television, for example, formal copyright law ’s derivative work right
may g ran t power to m anagers sufficient to enable the m anager to
organize the team , but inform al rules governing credit for work may
further support these hierarchical collaborations.28 In still other
instances, formal law m ay crowd out inform al rules (and vice
versa).211 Indeed, non-W estern cultural models th a t im port W estern
copyright law may underm ine existing inform al rules th a t are
necessary to support particular forms of creative collaboration.30
22. See infra Part FV.C.
23. See infra Part III.A.3.
24. See, e.g., Madeline Berg, Everything You Need to Know About the Hollywood Pay Gap,
F orbes (N ov. 12 , 2015,11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/2015/ll/12/every
thing-you-need-to-know-about-the-hollywood-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/C2KB-3QD2].
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1792.
27. See infra Part IV.B.l.
28. See infra Part IV. B.2.
29. See infra Part FV.D.
30. For example, when the law fails to define authorship in peculiar cases, there is no
backup norm to provide any guidance to the parties. See Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki,
Copyright in Teams, 80 U. Ch i . L. R ev . 1683, 1713-21 (2013) (discussing difficult authorship
cases where neither law nor custom could cleanly identify the “author”).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the literature on
creative organizations and on norms and customs. We show how
these areas of study intersect in creative collaboration to raise
important new questions. Part II describes the challenges of
creative collaboration and demonstrates that formal law is insuffi
cient to address those challenges. Part III first explores how
informal rules, enforced through mechanisms like trust and
reputation, can be the central organizational rules for creative
collaboration. It then demonstrates how creative collaboration may
be governed by informal rules that exist entirely apart from any
management hierarchy. Lastly, Part IV provides examples of these
mechanisms at work and identifies the important implications of
our analysis, which enables a better understanding of challenging
questions such as those presented in Garcia and Merkin.
I. C o n n e c t in g T h e o r ie s o f I n f o r m a l R u l e s
O r g a n iza t io n

to

T h e o r ie s

of

This Part connects two distinct strands of intellectual property
scholarship. The first analyzes informal rules31 that guide the
creation of intellectual property. Building on customs-and-norms
work in other fields, 32 scholars in this tradition have shown that
creative production can occur in areas where the primary mecha
nisms for regulating appropriation are informal rules, rather than
formal intellectual property law . 33
31. Terms like “custom,” “norm,” and “informal rule” are used to mean many things. See
Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 V a .L. R ev .
1899,1900 n.l (2007) (collecting sources demonstrating the various uses of these terms). And
very line lines can be drawn for any definition. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of
Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. L egal St u d .67, 72, 75-76 (1987)
(identifying five types of rules—personal ethics, norms, contract, organizational, and
governmental—and five types of sanction—self-sanction, personal self-help, vicarious selfhelp, organizational, and state). To illustrate our point, we will generally divide our analysis
into two categories: (1) informal rules—rules enforced through nonstate sanction—and (2)
formal law—rules enforced by state sanction.
32. See, e.g., R obert Axelrod , T he Evolution of Cooperation 6 (1984); R obert C.
E llickson , Order W ithout Law 4-6 (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal S t u d . 115,115 (1992);
Stewarx Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 A m . Soc.
R ev . 55, 56 (1963).

33. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 188; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at
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The second strand approaches intellectual property problems
from the perspective of the theory of the firm, an economic literatu re
devoted to understanding how and why production is organized in
a firm ra th e r th a n a m arket.34 This work has shown th a t intellec
tu a l property law influences not only creators’ motivations to
produce but also the organizational structures in which creators do
produce.
Both strands of literatu re address intellectual property generally.
For the purposes of this Article, we focus more narrow ly on
copyright. We do so because creative work in the artistic and
expressive fields regulated by copyright law may differ from creative
work in the technical and scientific fields regulated by p aten t law.35
In this P art, we review the implications of each stran d for copyright
law and identify im portant questions revealed by th eir nexus.

A. Encouraging Creative Production
According to the classic story of intellectual property, producers
have insufficient incentives to produce creative goods unless there
are barriers to copying.36 The traditional policy response to this
1790-91.
34. See generally Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory
of the Firm: What Have We learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. E con . P ersp . 181, 183
(2011); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 Am . E con . R ev . 777, 785-95 (1972); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 389 (1937); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. P ol . E con . 691, 691-93
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. P ol .
E con . 1119,1120 (1990); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & E con . 297, 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson,
The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 Am. E con . R ev . 112,
113-14 (1971).
35. Research in the interdisciplinary field of creativity studies has suggested that this is
the case. See John Baer, The Case for Domain Specificity of Creativity, 11 Creativity R es . J.
173, 174 (1998). For example, perhaps participants in technical or scientific fields can
generate predictable and objective criteria to measure whether an input has successfully
contributed to the creative process. This would enable a different set of solutions to creative
collaborations in those fields than is possible in the artistic and expressive fields regulated
by copyright law. We do not here express a view on the particular characteristics that might
distinguish the technical and scientific fields; we only note that it is possible that they differ
from those in the artistic and expressive fields and that a full exploration of this issue is
beyond the scope of the present Article.
36. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
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problem is to create intellectual property laws that impose legal
penalties on those who copy creative goods without permission. 37
While this story accurately describes a wide range of creative
activity, IP scholars have explored many ways in which it is
incomplete. The literature on informal rules and creativity has
focused on identifying norms that operate where formal intellectual
property law is weak, or on identifying how the legal system should
use norms and customs to guide the design of intellectual property
law . 38 A particular, though not exclusive, focus of this literature has
been on “negative spaces”: industries where the incentive effects
produced by formal copyright law’s rights of exclusion are weak or
nonexistent. 39
Creative production continues in these industries at least in part
because formal law is not the only mechanism that can prevent
copying; instead, social norms can plausibly do a lot of the same
work. 40 Social norms that punish unauthorized imitation might
substitute for formal legal barriers to copying, and thereby preserve
incentives to produce creative goods. 41
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 293-94 (1970); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 T . L. R . 1031, 1031-32 (2005); Oliar
& Sprigman. supra note 9, at 1790.
37. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1790.
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 9.
4 0 . Foundational work on social norms can be found in both property literature and
contract literature. See, e.g., E L L t C K S O N , supra note 3 2 , at 4 - 1 1 (describing private ordering
among ranchers in Shasta County, California, that rendered government-provided rules
irrelevant); Bernstein, supra note 3 2 , at 1 1 5 - 1 7 (discussing the diamond industry’s systematic
rejection of state-made rules in favor of an elaborate internal set of rules to handle disputes);
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 9 9 MlCH. L. R . 1 7 2 4 , 1 7 2 4 - 2 5 ( 2 0 0 1 ) (exploring
how the cotton industry has almost entirely replaced the public legal system with a private
commercial law system); Macaulay, supra note 3 2 , at 6 2 - 6 7 (exploring the informal rules
governing business relations in manufacturing). More recently, others have examined how
social norms might affect the structuring of transactions so as to prevent disputes from
arising, rather than resolving them after they occur. See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky,
Acqui-hiring, 6 3 D
L.J. 2 8 1 , 2 8 3 - 8 7 ( 2 0 1 3 ) (describing the cooperative norms in Silicon
Valley that drive large technology firms to avoid poaching teams of engineers from start-ups
and instead to pursue acqui-hires, in which venture capitalists and early investors receive
payments when the large firm absorbs all of the start-up’s engineering talent).
41. See generally Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 192-94 (describing anticopying
norms in French cuisine); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1809-31 (describing anticopying
norms in stand-up comedy). It is also possible that industry norms complement or subvert
legal rules regarding copying. See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 188; Oliar &
e x

e v

e v

u k e
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In negative spaces, norm s can substitute for the incentive
generating force of formal law.42 Thus, w hether legal protection is
m erely unavailable under prevailing doctrine,43 im practical or
impossible because of specific industry characteristics,44 or sup
planted by other community preferences,45inform al law can do w hat
formal law otherw ise might.
For example, in the world of stand-up comics, formal law does
very little to protect jokes.46 A stand-up comic who creates a new
joke cannot (for doctrinal and social reasons) tu rn to form al law to
prevent another comic from telling th e sam e joke.47 B ut th a t
negative space is filled by an inform al rule: comics should not tell
jokes previously told by other comics. Those who have been credibly
accused of violating this norm incur penalties from the community
of stand-up comics.48 These penalties are both pecuniary (lost
bookings) and nonpecuniary (in the form of reduced social status).49
Similarly, French chefs exist in a world of w eak formal law.
Copyright law does not provide m eaningful protection for novel
recipes developed by those chefs.50 B ut th e community regulates
(mis)appropriation: the chefs u n derstan d th a t m em bers of their
community will refuse to engage in m utually beneficial inform ation
exchange w ith chefs who have been credibly accused of copying
recipes from other chefs.51
The IP-norm s lite ra tu re both contradicts and confirms th e clas
sical theory. On the one hand, the literatu re rejects th e suggestions
Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1791-93; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms,
and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 Va . L. Rev. 505, 534-47
(2003) (exploring the emergence of social norms of copying in the file-sharing space).
42. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
43. Compare Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 191, with Buccafusco, supra note
9, at 1130-40.
44. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1790; Perzanowski, supra note 9, at 525-30.
45. See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 9, at 1691-92.
46. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1798.
47. See id. at 1799-805.
48. See id. at 1815-21.
49. See id. Similar dynamics—though complicated in part by the role of trademark
law—may also be at play in the fashion industry. See Hemphill & Suk, Remix and Cultural
Production, supra note 8, at 1229-31; Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note
9, at 1718-28; Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, supra note 8, at 1203-04.
50. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 187-88, 190.
51. See id. at 197-98. Other areas of creative production may also have similar norms. See,
e.g., Perzanowski, supra note 9, at 550-54.
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of some classical theories that formal law is the necessary and
exclusive means of protection for creative production. On the other
hand, it supports the incentive story that tells us creators need
protection from free-riding by rivals to support creative production. 02
B. Organizing Creative Production
The classic theory of copyright law has another unrelated
shortcoming: it generally assumes that a sole creator acts alone to
produce creative work. 53 This assumption is consistent with popular
Western conceptions of creative production. 54 But it is inconsistent
with how creativity actually occurs. Virtually all creative work is
collaborative or cumulative. 55 As scholars of the organization of
intellectual production show, the collaborative nature of most
creative work means creators face crucial organizational issues that
the classic theory simply does not address.
Consider the possibility that two creative inputs must be
combined to produce a finished product. 56 Formal intellectual
property law does not protect creative inputs from appropriation, at
least not during the course of much of the production process. 57 Still,
creative goods are commonly produced by a team of people, each of
whom provides creative inputs to the joint project. Such a team
faces the risk of shirking by teammates because it will often be hard
52. See Breyer, supra note 36, at 293-94. That story of the need for incentives (formal or
informal) is not without its critics. See id. at 321-23 (challenging the empirical underpinnings
for the standard justification of copyright law).
53. See BENKLER, supra note 16, at 42 (describing the “ideal-type strategy that underlies
patents and copyrights” as resting on a conception “of the information producer as a single
author or inventor laboring creatively”).
54. See supra note 16.
55. As Rebecca Tushnet notes, “[t]he concept of Romantic authorship has come under
sustained analytic assault, as scholars have demonstrated that all works derive from other
works.” Rebecca Tushnet, The Romantic Author and the Romance Writer: Resisting Gendered
Concepts of Creativity, in Diversity in I ntellectual P roperty 294, 295 (Irene Calboli &
Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright
Trust, 100 CORNELL L. R ev . 1015, 1016-17 (2015); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1685.
56. In the noncreative context, where inputs are tangible assets managed by different
people who cannot write perfectly complete contracts, the standard property-rights solution
to this sort of problem is integration. See Hart & Moore, supra note 34, at 1131-49; see also
Aghion & Holden, supra note 34, at 182-83.
57. Copyright protection begins only upon fixation. See generally Casey & Sawicki, supra
note 30, at 1714.
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to observe or verify w hether each team m em ber is carrying her
weight, and because the team m em bers’ efforts produce a single,
inseparable good.58
In m any production functions outside the context of creative
collaborations, the costs of shirking can be reduced by contract
or—where contracts are incomplete—by imposing the hierarchical
m anagem ent structure of a firm .59 These m echanism s are often
provided by a particular kind of firm—a hierarchy w ith a m anager
a t the top.60
Creative collaborators, however, will find firm structures more
difficult to design. The problem they face is how to m onitor or
control team s w hen the m em bers are providing inseparable
contributions th a t are difficult to observe.61 To solve this problem,
creative collaboration requires (more so th a n other endeavors)
either (1) a special monitoring mechanism th a t can com pensate nonverifiable effort, or (2) a special enforcem ent m echanism th a t can
rew ard or punish entire team s based on output.62 As explained
below, this is because the n atu re of a creative input is th a t it is hard
to define and m easure. It is hard to observe—and even h ard er to
58. Additional organizational theories tell us how intellectual property law can affect
production that combines creative and noncreative goods. Pioneering research by Ashish
Arora & Robert Merges and Dan Burk & Brett McDonnell explores this question. They used
the theory of the firm lens to understand formal intellectual property law and provide insights
into its influence on market transactions and integration trends in tech industries. See Ashish
Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries,
13 INDUS. & Corp . Change 451, 451-56 (2004); Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the
Firm, 71 U. Ch i . L. Rev . 3, 3-4,20 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks
Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. II I.
L. R ev. 575, 575-78, 633-36; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets,
and the Value of Intangible Assets 5 (Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.
law.berkeley.edu/files/iprights.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4GB-A3QL]; see also Oren Bar-Gill &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. Pa. L.
R ev . 1649, 1650-58 (2009); Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organiza
tion, 84 S. Cal . L. R ev . 785, 787-93 (2011); Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the
Firm, 101 Nw. U. L. R ev . 1123, 1124-28 (2007).
59. See Coase, supra note 34, at 398-401; Williamson, supra note 34, at 113-14.
60. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 34, at 781-83; Coase, supra note 34, at 403-05;
Williamson, supra note 34, at 113-14.
61. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1699-706; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 Va. L. R ev . 1683, 1686 (2014); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 55, at 1050-54.
62. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1702-12.

2017]

THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION

1807

verify—whether each writer in a group jointly writing a novel
contributed her best ideas and efforts. Or whether a pair of actors
put in their best effort rather than held back because they did not
like the director’s style. Or whether the members of a band brought
the right energy level to a stage performance.
The organizational solution to these team production problems
can take one of two general forms. First, the creative inputs may
hire a manager who closely monitors each input to detect shirking . 63
Alternatively, where even a monitor cannot observe effort, the
creative inputs may hire a manager who measures the team’s total
output and enforces penalties or rewards depending on whether that
output surpassed some threshold . 64
Formal law can, in limited circumstances, facilitate these
structures and the creative collaborations they serve to some degree.
We have explored this point in prior work. 66 But formal law is not
the only factor influencing the design of such organizational
structures . 66 Indeed, it is not even the most important. Rather, the
limitations on formal law as an organizational device in the
production of copyrightable works create a vast organizational
negative space where formal law has no (or at most severely limited)
influence. 67 The existence of robust collaboration in the creative
industries despite this negative space suggests that there are
informal rules at work. 68 If that is the case, and we think it is, the
next steps are to identify and evaluate those informal rules. We do
so in the following Parts.

63. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 34, at 781; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at
1695-96.
64. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1703-04; Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in
Teams, 13 B ell J. Economics 324, 336-37 (1982).
65. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1721-38 (showing how derivate rights law can
create a reward mechanism th at facilitates team collaboration and how work-made-for-hire
and joint-works doctrine can either facilitate or hinder collaboration depending on specific
design).
66. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 61, at 1686-88 (unplanned coauthorship); Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 55, at 1054-59 (copyright trusts).
67. See supra Part I.A.
68. See supra Part I.A.
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II. T h e P r o b l e m o f C r e a t iv e C o l l a b o r a t io n a n d
S h o r t c o m in g s o f F o rm a l L aw

the

In this P a rt we explore how informal rules can address the
organizational challenges of creative collaboration. We first
introduce the organizational challenges and then examine potential
solutions. We show th a t while the m anagerial hierarchy of a firm
can sometimes organize creative collaborative activity, in this realm
the law necessary to support such organization is significantly
limited.

A. The Challenges of Creative Collaboration
Suppose th a t two authors—Jan e and Toni—wish to jointly w rite
a novel. Four factors will affect th eir ability to collaborate:
observability, verifiability, allocation, and certainty.69 The more
these factors are present, the easier it will be for the authors to
collaborate. B ut these factors tend to be absent in creative activities.
First, it is difficult for each autho r to observe the effort of the
other. If Jan e sees Toni sitting in a coffee shop, she cannot easily
know w hether Toni is simply daydream ing or is, instead, thinking
hard about how to use prose to convey a character’s insanity. As a
result, Ja n e cannot effectively punish Toni for failing to pu t forth
the effort she prom ised to exert.
Second, it is difficult for anyone to verify the level of each au th o r’s
performance. Ja n e cannot easily dem onstrate to a court th a t Toni
has been keeping her best prose to herself ra th e r th an putting it
into th eir joint novel.70
Third, the result of their collaboration—a novel—will resist
attem p ts to allocate or assign output value to the separate inputs
from the respective authors. If a scene in the novel is excellent, it
will be difficult to know w hether th a t excellence is attrib u tab le to
the person who first drafted it, to the one who edited it, to the one
69. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1700.
70. Observability and verifiability are not necessarily coextensive. In some cases, one
author may have observed the other’s laziness but be unable to verify it to an outsider like a
court.
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who wrote the preceding scene, to the one who thought up the
setting for the scene, and so on.
Finally, the potential value of their collaboration is uncertain.
Because the work is creative, it will be hard to predict in advance
how much it could possibly be worth . 71 As a result, the parties
cannot simply agree to produce a novel of a given value . 72
B. The Role of Managers
Because observability, verifiability, allocation, and certainty are
lacking, Jane and Toni will find it difficult to collaborate on their
own. They might instead try to organize their efforts by hiring a
manager. 73 Rather than relying on price signals (or their own good
will) to allocate resources, Jane and Toni can create a hierarchy
with a manager at the top . 74 In this hierarchy, perhaps the manager
can add to the work’s observability or verifiability. The manager can
closely monitor Jane and Toni in an attempt to determine whether
either is shirking and to document that shirking . 75 This can work if
the reason that Jane and Toni could not observe was because they
were busy creating inputs or because individuals vary in their skill
at observing others.
In many creative endeavors, though, the lack of observability
stems not from the limitation on monitoring resources or skill, but
from the inherent nature of the creative work itself. 76 Where no
one—including the manager—can observe or verify the creative
inputs, the manager still has a role to play. The manager can
enforce penalties (or rewards) on both Jane and Toni if their joint
output is below (or above) a threshold.

71. See Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. C hi.L. R ev .331,
363 (2012).
72. See id.
73. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1701-12.
74. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 34, at 781-83.
75. See id.
76. Not even the most diligent or skilled monitor can distinguish daydreaming from

creative thought. But that may one day change. See Siyuan Liu et at, Neural Correlates of
Lyrical Improvisation: An fMRI Study of Freestyle Rap, SCI. R ep ., N ov . 15, 2012, at 1-2
(suggesting the possibility of using technology to detect brain waves associated with creative
activity).
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If Jan e and Toni benefit from shirking, b u t a m anager cannot
observe or verify who shirked, the m anager can still punish the
entire team w henever the project is unsuccessful. If the entire team
is punished w hen the end product is unsatisfactory, Ja n e and Toni
will have an incentive to perform because the punishm ent elim i
nates the value of shirking.77 These penalties (or rew ards) can
therefore substitute for monitoring.
This role requires some degree of certainty about w hat is a good
product or a bad product.78 B ut th a t certainty need not exist ex
ante—the m anager may be able to enforce penalties based on a
threshold th a t is only known after production is complete.79 This
avoids the need to spend prohibitive sum s predicting and planning
for countless contingencies, as would be required of a team relying
on formal contract law.80
For example, im agine a blockbuster movie set to release next
sum m er. The threshold for a “good” opening weekend tu rn s on the
state of the economy, the state of the movie industry, the w eather,
and m any other factors th a t cannot be known w hen th e creative
inputs are contracting to work on the movie, or even during
production.81 After the opening weekend has passed, m any of these
factors will become known. The m anager can use th a t knowledge to
retroactively rew ard or punish the team .82 If th e team members
know th a t th e m anager will use later-revealed inform ation to
allocate rew ards and enforce penalties, they know th a t they will be
com pensated in proportion to th e relative success of th e team .83
They will be punished or rew arded based on the value th e team
added and not based on the fortuities of the w eather.84 The m anager
can thus effectively elicit effort on the collaborative work.85
77. See Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 327.
78. See id. at 325.
79. See id. at 328-29.
80. See id. at 324.
81. One could imagine a contract that contemplates these possibilities, but a contract
covering the infinite possible states of the world would be costly to draft and negotiate. Such
negotiation, even if theoretically possible, would be prohibitively expensive. For practical
purposes, then, we can assume such a contract cannot be written.
82. See Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 327.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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To summarize the point, creative inputs face a monitoring
challenge when collaborating. By organizing into a managerial
hierarchy, the inputs can prevent shirking. The manager who can
observe will be able to police effort. The manager who can reward
will be able to align incentives without observation. 86 The manager
retains the residual claim, which grants her the power to reward,
punish, and reallocate . 87
C. Why Formal Law Is Ineffective in Organizing Collaboration
Managerial oversight is, however, imperfect. Neither contract
rights nor property rights can completely allocate control over
creative collaboration. 88 This is true because the four factors
discussed above (observability, verifiability, allocation, and cer
tainty) are often scarce in creative collaboration. 89
Parties will find it difficult to write a contract by which a
manager can oversee efforts because they will often lack the ability
to observe or verify outcomes. 90 A contractual right to require a
creative input’s best idea is not enforceable when the relative
quality of the idea cannot be observed, verified, or predicted . 91
86. In its pure form, this structure demands that the manager must not be an input
provider. See id. at 338-39. In practice, the level of managerial input is likely a factor that
impacts the effectiveness of the manager. In the creative context, it may also be th at the
manager provides noncreative inputs.
87. In the copyright context, this suggests that the law’s focus on authorship to determine
ownership and control is misguided. It also suggests that post-production rights like
derivative works may serve reward functions that can be used to facilitate collaboration on
the original work. See generally Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1726-39.
88. See Anthony J. Casey, Mind Control: Firms and the Production o f Ideas, 35 S eattle
U. L. Rev. 1061, 1066-67 (2012); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1690-700.
89. For an interesting analysis of the observability and certainty problems in a creative
industry, see Robert R. Faulkner & Andy B. Anderson, Short-term Projects and Emergent
Careers: Evidence from Hollywood, 92 Am . J. S ociology 879, 885-86 (1987) (describing the
connection between “means and ends” in film as “obscure and uncertain,” comparing the film
industry to gambling and wildcat oil drilling, and providing examples of the uncertainty
filmmakers face).
90. See Lawyers for the Creative Arts , L egal I ssues in F ilm P roduction 14-15
(2006), https://law-arts.org/pdf/Legal_Issues_in_Film_Production.pdf [https://perma.cc/89N7H2VW]; Elana Harris, The Right to Final Cut Approval: The Struggle for Creative Control
Between the Director and the Studio in Feature Filmmaking 36-37 (2013) (unpublished
seminar paper), http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/E%20Harris%20Final%20
Seminar%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM4Z-H4FS].
91. See Faulkner & Anderson, supra note 89, at 885-86.
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Similarly, a contract term th a t requires a collaborator to be a “team
player” is particularly hard to enforce when the team is engaged in
creating things like movie scenes or character chem istry in a play.92
M anagem ent through property rights can be even more difficult.
Property rights are generally thought to facilitate organization
where one in p u t provider or m anager can take ownership of the
crucial assets.93 T hat person receives residual control over those
assets and, thus, over the project.94 Using th a t control, the m anager
can direct other input providers and then punish and rew ard
collaboration through profits from the project95 or through access to
the project.96
If all inputs in th e collaboration are creative ideas, m anagers may
have no property rights to control because copyright does not extend
to ideas.97 W ithout property rights, the m anager has no access or
control rights th a t she can wield as a carrot or a stick to encourage
optim al perform ance.98 Moreover, even if the m anager possesses
some property rights relevant to the creative collaboration (in
com plem entary assets, for example), those rights will provide little
protection to a m anager-owner who cannot observe inputs, allocate
outputs, or predict outcomes.99 The th re a t to w ithhold property or
access to property as a punishm ent for lack of collaborative effort is
of little value w hen the m anager cannot observe, verify, or allocate
levels of collaborative effort in the first place.100

92. See Casey, supra note 88, at 1079.
93. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1690-700 (summarizinga basic property-rights
theory of firms).
94. See id.
95. Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 327.
96. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
E conomics 387, 395-405 (1998) (presenting an access-based theory of firms and property
rights).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea ... embodied in such work”); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that copyright law protects expression, not the underlying
ideas).
98. See Hart & Moore, supra note 34, at 1120 (developing a theory of the firm that
depends on property rights to allocate residual control over assets); Rajan & Zingales, supra
note 96, at 395-405 (developing a theory of the firm that depends on property rights to control
access to assets).
99. See generally Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30.
100. See generally id.
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At best, imperfect mechanisms of rewards and punishments can
be cobbled together through a combination of contract and property
rights. Thus, for example, derivative works rights—if allocated to a
team manager—might serve as a reward that can be doled out ex
post to encourage collaboration. 101 The manager can use the promise
of inclusion in future derivative projects as a carrot. These reward
systems are imprecise and depend on conditions that are not
universally present. For example, a reward based on derivative
works rights can facilitate collaboration only when a project is likely
to produce valuable works “based upon” the original work. 102 If the
project is plainly a one-off collaboration, no such reward is available.
Similarly, a team member needs to have a reasonable expectation
that she is a plausible participant in future projects in order for
access to future projects to serve as a carrot for cooperation on the
current project. 103
Thus, a large space exists where formal law cannot facilitate
collaboration. And yet collaboration flourishes. There will of course
be creative activities that are relatively more or less collaborative
than others. Movies involve massive collaborations of dozens of
people or more. Plays may involve fewer. Books may involve even
fewer. 104 The implication of our analysis is that informal rules will
be of greater importance for the more collaborative activities. But
the bulk of creativity has a significant direct or indirect collabora
tive component, suggesting that informal rules play a central and
core function for most creative activity.
II I. M e c h a n is m s

for

E n f o r c in g I n f o r m a l R u l e s

We suggest that there exists a set of informal rules that facili
tates or substitutes for the role of a manager in organizing creative
collaboration. At a high level of generality, these informal rules may
101. Id. at 1706-07.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works”).
103. For example, an actor playing a character that dies in a movie may have no plausible
expectation of being involved in a sequel.
104. Rare indeed is a truly solo author. Even the solo novelist is collaborating with her com
munity peers, her mentors, her agent, her editors, and those prior artists who influence her
work.
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include im peratives such as (1) do not shirk, (2) do not withhold
ideas th a t could contribute to the project, and (3) do not appropriate
to yourself ideas suggested by o thers.105 Inform al rules only work if
mechanism s exist to encourage compliance.106 M echanisms th a t
punish violations of (or rew ard compliance with) these rules can
m ake it easier to organize creative collaborations by punishing team
m embers who do not perform or by m aking it easier for the m anag
ers to identify team m embers who are likely to perform in the first
instance.
One possible m echanism is internalization, in which an individual
ensures her own compliance w ith the inform al rule simply because
she prefers to comply.107 Of course, the assum ption of full in te rn a l
ization is unrealistic, and inform al rules are generally not entirely
self-enforcing. Instead, other m echanism s such as reputation and
tru s t can provide the avenue for enforcing inform al ru les.108 In this
P art, we explore these m echanism s for enforcing inform al rules in
the context of creative collaboration, and th eir potential costs.

105. The precise specification of the content of these imperatives must await empirical
investigation.
106. There is some debate over the terminology to describe the mechanisms that transfer
informal rules into behavioral regularity. Compare E ric A. P osner , Law and S ocial N orms
11-13 (2000), with Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis
of Internalized Norms, 86 Va . L. R ev . 1577, 1583 (2000), and Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 M ic h . L. R ev . 338, 365-66 (1997). We will
simply refer to informal rules as the desired behavior and mechanisms as anything that
makes that behavior more likely. We explore now what those mechanisms might be.
107. See Cooter, supra note 106, at 1583-84 (explaining that individuals may have a taste
or preference for complying with a norm, thereby placing intrinsic value on compliance apart
from its instrumental value). Relatedly, many participants in creative activities do so for a
range of reasons, including intrinsic motivations. See JESSICA SlLBEY, T he E ureka M yth :
C reators , I nnovators, and E veryday I ntellectual P roperty 53 (2015); Fagundes, supra
note 16, at 1142. While such individuals may pursue creative collaborations because they
derive pleasure from doing so, we assume they would nonetheless prefer to work with
collaborators who do not shirk; accordingly, even if creators are intrinsically motivated, the
problems of creative collaborations may undermine their work absent the kinds of
mechanisms we describe.
108. See McAdams, supra note 106, at 350.
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A. How Managers Can Use Reputation and Trust
1. Reputation

We define reputation as information about a person obtained from
“the collective experience of others who have previously dealt with
that person .” 109 Norms-based systems frequently rely on reputation
to enforce rules . 110 Individuals who violate an informal rule can be
subjected to reputational attacks that directly harm them or affect
their standing among peers . *111 Reputation has several characteris
tics that make it particularly valuable for managers facilitating
team production.
Managers can coordinate creative production if they can effec
tively provide rewards (or enforce penalties) when a team produces
more (or less) than some threshold . 112 Optimally, the manager will
have a supply of rewards that is not limited by his project budget. ' 13
In most cases that is not possible (budgets constrain most projects),
but reputational rewards are different. The value (and cost) for
reputational rewards (and penalties) can be drawn from future
projects. 114 The manager can use reputational rewards that impose
109. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting
in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. R e v . 1377, 1393 (2010).
110. See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 193 (describing a famous chef’s
attack on a former employee’s reputation in response to the latter’s violation of an attribution
norm); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1815 (describing reputational attacks as
punishment for violation of a norm).
111. See Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 189.
112. See Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 325.
113. The ability to break the budget constraint is important in preventing renegotiation.
See id. For example, there is a project that will produce 39 if three team members perform
optimally. Performance costs 10 each. If anyone shirks the project will earn 33 and the shirker
will have no cost. The shirker gets 11 surplus from shirking and only 3 surplus from
performing. But the other team members get only 1. To solve this problem the manager has
to be able to punish the team when it earns only 33. The manager can destroy value and
reduce the total payout to 0 when the project earns 33 or less (thus the manager is not
constrained by the actual budget). Now the shirking team member gets nothing and has an
incentive not to shirk. Or the manager could reward performance by paying out 66 whenever
the project produced 39 or more (again the manager is not constrained by the budget). Now
the team members get 12 from performing and have no incentive to shirk. In most contexts,
it is difficult to break out of the budget constraint. But rewards and penalties enforced
through reputation and tru st may make it possible to do so in the world of creative
collaboration. See id.
114. See id. at 327-28.
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no m onetary cost on the m anager b u t th a t th e productive team
m em ber can tra n slate into money in later projects w hen she is able
to command a prem ium from her future team m ates.115
R eputation can also be useful where the perform ance of team
m embers is observable to the m anager, b u t still unverifiable. The
m anager can tell the world th a t the project failed because team
m embers shirked, and, as long as the relevant community has some
level of confidence in the m anager’s judgm ent, the inability to verify
the shirking to a court is u nim portan t.116 P u t simply, the m anager
may have to overcome a higher burden of proof and rely on more
lim ited evidence to convince a judge th a n to convince h er close-knit
circle of peers. The community may accept the m anager’s statem en t
th a t “Anne was a m iserable actress and impossible to deal w ith in
my last movie,” even when the m anager cannot prove any formal
breach of A nne’s contract. If so, and if Anne is m otivated by seeking
the renown of her colleagues (or critics or th e public a t large), then
she may not shirk even if she would otherw ise have a pecuniary
m otivation to do so.
M anagers m ay also be able to rely on reputation even in the face
of low observability (as well as low verifiability, certainty, and
allocability). Im agine a project th at, ex ante, has an uncertain
outcome. The effort of each mem ber is unobservable and unverifi
able. Similarly, output value cannot be allocated to inputs. As long
as the m anager can recognize project failure ex post, reputation can
still serve to prevent shirking. To see how, suppose a project
requires effort from various team members. If any one of them
shirks, there will be some degree of failure. The m anager has no
idea ex ante how much a successful project will be worth. After the
fact, the m anager can determ ine w hether the project was a relative
failure because previously unknowable inform ation has become
know n,117 like cultural, political, or other exogenous events th a t
115. This extends Bengt Holmstrom’s point that moral hazard in teams can be avoided if
failure can be punished by precluding future membership in the relationship. See id. at 327.
Reputation can also be intrinsically valuable to creators, apart from its pecuniary
implications. See SlLBEY, supra note 107, at 149-83.
116. Cf. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 193 (discussing reputational harm to chefs
acting in bad faith); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1815 (discussing reputational harm
to comedians acting in bad faith).
117. Exogenous shifts could also make a movie’s success less impressive. For example, if
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made the subject matter of a film unappealing. For example,
expectations of what constitutes a successful debut weekend for a
movie opening next summer might change in response to an
exogenous cultural shift (for example, Donald Trump makes
America great again) or a weather event (for example, a hurricane
strikes the northeast).
With hindsight, the manager now knows how much a successful
project would have produced and can judge the team’s effort based
on comparing the outcome to that metric . 118 If the team performed
poorly, the manager can let that be known. This knock to the team
members’ reputation is a penalty for underperformance. As long as
the reputational stain is high enough and the members know that
the manager can impose the penalty, it will be effective in discour
aging shirking . 119
For any of this to work, the manager’s message to the community
must be relevant and credible. The industry need not know what it
was that made Anne a bad actress, but it needs to know that there
is such a thing as an objectively bad actress. Different traits will,
therefore, be more or less susceptible to reputational assessment.
Several film producers suggested to us that reputation is especially
useful for questions about being a good “team player” (which
includes things like temperament, cooperation, or how the person
deals with creative management and critique) . 120 It appears to be
a particular genre becomes extremely popular, then the measure of success for movies in that
genre might require better performance than was expected when the project began. We have
suggested elsewhere that a scenario like this may be at play in the movie industry and might
be a factor in the sequel “reboot” phenomenon. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1730-31.
118. For a recent example, consider The Interview, the release of which was limited by Sony
in response to North Korea’s cyberattack on Sony. Holly Yan & Ben Brumfield, North Korea
Lambasts U.S. over The Interview,’ Says Obama Is the 'Culprit,' CNN (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:51
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/27/world/asia/north-korea-the-interview-reaction/ [https://
perma.cc/GG3P-6KZ2J. In this context, the film may be expected to generate very low
revenues, much lower than would have been expected in the absence of North Korea’s action.
119. Say C was shirking and only provided 5 in work, and was paid 11 of the 33 output. If
everyone performed, C would have been paid 13 of 39 with an effort of 10. Shirking provides
6 in surplus to C. Not shirking provides 3. As long as the reputation penalty to each team
member is more than 3, reputation will be an effective means of overcoming moral hazard.
For the full theory behind this outcome, see generally Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30; and
Holmstrom, supra note 64.
120. See infra Part IV.B.l. The producers viewed themselves as more capable of
independently judging pure talent and relied less on their network for things th at might fall
under that rubric.
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possible to objectively determine whether someone is a team player.
A manager may be able to observe that sort of characteristic.
Crucially though, she may be unable to correct for it through
monitoring, and it can be very difficult to verify. Under these
conditions, the reputational messages can be especially important.
All of this suggests that reputation, by creating a mechanism for
punishing and rewarding performance when contracts and other
legal rights fall short, makes it easier for creators to work in
collaborative groups. This, in turn, provides better information to
subsequent managers about potential new team members. When a
creative community can rely on credible sources of information
about an individual’s potential value in a collaboration, a manager
can more readily make decisions about teammates for future
projects even though the manager has never before worked with
those individuals, and the individuals may never have worked with
each other either.121

2. Trust
Trust122 is information obtained by an individual’s own experience
with a person.123 A manager or team member may have first-hand
information about another team member and can then use that
121. This mixing of teammates has been correlated with higher quality creative output.
See, e.g., Brian Uzzi & Jarrett Spiro, Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem,
111 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 447, 492-93 (2005) (arguing that the quality of the creative output in
Broadway musicals is a function of the mixing of teammates across projects).
122. There are many ways to define trust. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational
Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. L egal
Analysis 561, 592-96 (2015) (examining the various theories on the role of trust and social
capital in complex commercial transactions). Common definitions focus on a belief that a
counterparty will not intentionally cheat or expectations that involved parties will act to each
other’s mutual benefit. See id. We use the word trust consistently with those definitions but
stress the source of the content as the distinguishing factor between reputation and trust.
Compare supra note 109 and accompanying text, with Bernstein, supra, at 589.
123. The exact causes or origins of trust are hard to pin down. But extensive experimental
evidence has established that trust plays an important role in human interactions, including
those in markets. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. P a . L. R ev . 1735, 1738 (2001) (collecting
sources and reviewing the experimental literature); Jillian Jordan et al., Why We Cooperate,
in T he M oral Brain : A M ultidisciplinary P erspective 87, 94-95 (Jean Decety & Thalia
Wheatley eds., 2015); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 M ich . L. R ev . 71, 103 (2003).
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inform ation to evaluate the person’s suitability for any particular
project.
T rust is more effective when you have a lim ited num ber of
team m ates w ith whom you will engage in repeated collaborations . 124
After an initial investm ent in developing tru st, it may be b etter to
capture the re tu rn on th a t investm ent over several collaborations . 125
Like reputation, tru s t can fill a gap left by a lack of observability,
verifiability, certainty, or allocation . 126 If a team of th ree or more
input providers fails, those who performed will d istru st other
members. This will prevent th a t team from existing in th a t form
going forward. J u s t as reputation can tell the m arket th e team is
bad and its members should not be hired, a lack of tru s t can tell the
team members them selves th a t the team is bad and should not be
continued. All team m embers lose out on future membership. If th a t
punishm ent is strong enough and team m embers are aw are th a t it
will be applied, it will provide an incentive against shirking . 127
T rust in the sense used here—as inform ation derived from prior
interactions w ith another person—may serve as th e basis for
continuing collaborative efforts. Consider this description of Bob and
Harvey W einstein’s strategy w hen they were running M iram ax’s
negotiations to acquire Swingers. The film m akers were insisting on
control over the final cut—the right to determ ine w hen the film was
complete and ready for distribution . 128 This was an u n u su al dem and
124. In our discussion of talent agents, we suggest that the agents are reputation
intermediaries. See infra Part FV.B.2. They could of course also be trust intermediaries. A
producer may trust an agent or may know th at agent to be of good reputation. Our interviews
suggest that the network is strong enough that reputation does a lot of work. See infra Part
IV.B.l. And thus a producer will be willing to work with an agent who she does not personally
know if that agent has a strong reputation.
125. Again, our discussions with producers are consistent with this idea. See infra note 245.
In particular they appear to value repeat interactions with directors after they learn they can
trust each other. See infra Part IV.B.l.
126. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
127. See Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 327-28.
128. See Alex French & Howie Kahn, So Money: An Oral History of Swingers, GRANTLAND (Jan. 22,2014), http://grantland.com/features/an-oral-history-swingers/ [https://perma.
cc/EGE5-NGW2]. Interviews with producers have suggested a particularly interesting set of
informal rules around final cuts. Producers generally insist on retaining final cut rights, but
they vary widely in the extent to which they exercise those rights. See infra Part IV.B.l.
Production companies with a reputation for heavy-handed final cuts face a challenge in
attracting talented writers, directors, and actors. See infra Part IV.B.l. One producer also
suggested that this was an area where agents played a strong intermediary role collecting and
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from the film m akers, especially because they had essentially no
track record.129 Yet the W einsteins and M iram ax agreed to relin 
quish final cut control over Swingers; one of the key participants in
the film described their understanding:
But this is where the Weinsteins were so smart. They started
getting the idea of “We’re not just buying the movie, we’re
buying relationships with the filmmakers. We’re going to be in
business with Jon Favreau. We’re going to be in business with
Vince Vaughn. We’re going to be in business with Doug Liman.
And if we ever want to do anything in the future with these
guys, we’ve got this over their heads to say, ‘Hey, we started you
out.’” It’s just really, really smart business.130
A possible inference from the language, “if we ever w ant to do any
thing in the future w ith these guys, we’ve got this over th eir heads,”
is th a t the W einsteins signaled their ability and willingness to
punish violations of th eir tru s t by extracting concessions in future
projects.131 The flip side of this is th a t th e W einsteins’ experience
w ith Favreau, V aughn, and Lim an could facilitate future business
w ith them —a good final cut on Swingers would m ake the W ein
steins more likely to allow them sim ilar creative control over future
projects. Producers have an in terest in developing relationships
w ith successful film m akers th a t can lead to future projects.132 And
the personal connections th a t m ight m ake th a t relationship strong
can be more valuable th a n specific term s in a contract or even
financial com pensation on the current project.133
The line betw een tru s t and reputation is, of course, blurry. For
example, the line—“if we ever w ant to do anything in the fu tu re
w ith these guys, we’ve got this over th eir heads to say, ‘Hey, we
communicating reputational information about the use of the final cut right. See, e.g., infra
Part IV.B.2. The noteworthy point is that the norms play a much larger role than any contract
terms.
129. See French & Kahn, supra note 128.
130. See id.
131. We might wonder how the Weinsteins could extract such concessions; after all, in
future deals, the filmmakers would presumably be free to negotiate with any production
company. One partial answer to this puzzle may be found in the relationship between trust
and reputation. Cf. Bernstein, supra note 122, at 591-92.
132. See, e.g., infra note 245; cf. Uzzi & Spiro, supra note 121, at 474.
133. See supra Part II.C.
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started you out’”—could be read not only as an explicit statement
regarding the trust the Weinsteins were vesting in the filmmakers,
but also as a threat to apply reputational penalties if Favreau,
Vaughn, or Liman did not perform on this or future projects. If there
is a norm of loyalty, a reputation for shunning the studio that gave
you enormous freedom and got you started might hurt a filmmaker’s
future prospects. The Weinsteins could talk to other Hollywood
producers and tell a plausible story that the filmmakers acted
unfairly if, after getting final cut control on their first film, they
later played hardball or shirked on subsequent projects. 134 On the
other hand, the statement might be assuming only that individuals
simply feel an internal duty of loyalty. For our purposes, the key
observation is simply that the bonds of this agreement were
informal rules of some form rather than formal legal obligations.
3. The Costs of Reputation and Trust
Although reputation and trust can facilitate creative collaboration
by enforcing informal rules, there are several potential disadvan
tages. One is that relying on reputation favors generic projects. An
input provider’s reputation for performing tasks with idiosyncratic
value is not meaningful for many potential projects. To be useful,
reputation must provide information about tasks that will matter
in future projects. Work that does not provide information applica
ble to other projects does not produce useful reputational informa
tion.
This suggests that the more generic a project is, the more future
value (in terms of usable reputational information) it will generate.
Repeat play and generic projects will be disproportionately favored
because the possibility of doling out reputational rewards does not
exist to the same extent for one-off and idiosyncratic projects. Thus,
a generic project of low value might be favored over a unique project
of high value . 135 Call this the Marvel hypothesis. 136
134. See, e.g., infra P art IV.B.l.
135. In a sense, reputation produces a contingent future value th a t can be doled out as a
rew ard to keep the team together. Counterintuitively, "he future contingent value of
reputation can be more useful th a n the present value of the project itself because reputation
can be used to bind th e team in a way th a t th e present value of th e project cannot.
136. See, e.g., P eter Suderm an, Superhero Movies Have Become Too Formulaic. Deadpool
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We m ust also consider the possibility th a t inform al rules may be
a b arrier to entry in a way th a t strong intellectual property rights
are not.137 Inform al rules may system atically tre a t new en tran ts
worse th a n incum bents.138 Indeed, the fact th a t informal rules are
m aintained by incum bents gives us a prim a facie reason to suspect
th a t they will be designed to protect incum bents’ positions against
entry.139 For example, recall th a t reputation m ight be used to inform
the selection of m embers in a team .140 People in th e industry will
use inform ation gleaned from a prospective team m em ber’s past
perform ances to guide th eir decisions w hether to add the prospec
tive mem ber to the team for a new project.141 B ut a new e n tra n t’s
reputation will be thin—she will have had no (or few) past perfor
mances th a t others could rely on. She will accordingly find it more
difficult to find attractive projects to work on th a n will established
players.142
These b arriers may also reduce movement across industry
sectors, creating silos or pockets of production types. Film talen t
may stay in film, and television talen t may stay in television,
because inform ation about inputs does not easily tran sfer across
different kinds of projects, even when there are surface sim ilarities
in the work required (for example, acting on a television show and
acting in film).143 Combined w ith the challenges facing new e n 
tra n ts , we should worry th a t the best talen t for a particular job is
passed over simply because m anagers have b etter inform ation about
other ta le n t.144
Perhaps the most pernicious risk of informal rules is th eir power
to entrench biases. Form al law can be challenged in courts or
Makes a Case for Breaking the Mold, Vox (Feb. 17, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/
2/17/11021144/deadpool-superhero-movies-formuIaic (https://perma.cc/EE4H-8LMB].
137. Cf. Perzanowski, supra note 9, at 581, 583-84 (explaining how norms against copying
custom tattoo designs function as barriers to entry).
138. See, e.g., id.
139. See id. at 581 nn.596 & 599; Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable
Goods, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1251, 1254 (2004).
140. See supra notes 120-21 and accompany text.
141. See, e.g., infra note 245.
142. There is some data suggesting this barrier is significant in film. See, e.g., Faulkner &
Anderson, supra note 89, at 890, 892, 908 (providing evidence that past credits increase the
chances of future work and describing the film industry as a “rich get richer” environment).
143. Cf. Uzzi & Spiro, supra note 121, at 492.
144. See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of how bias can play into hiring decisions.
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through legislation. Inform al rules are often self-executing or rely
on the collective action of a community as a whole.145 W here self
executing rules are biased, they will be difficult to dislodge.146
Similarly, where the rules are enforced through collective action of
a community, the existing biases of th a t community will shape
enforcem ent.147 In either case, the victim of bias cannot appeal to a
higher or neu tral authority.
Some biases m ay be benign, but others—particularly those based
on race, gender, sexual orientation, or sim ilar categories—harm the
victims of the bias, the industry, and society as a whole. These
biases may m anifest them selves directly or through more subtle
channels.148
An industry th a t builds its team s based on reputation will
perpetuate team structures biased in directly observable w ays.149
For example, some evidence suggests th a t film crews are over
whelmingly (77.4 percent) m ale.150Thus, the pool of people who have
any reputation as film crew members is going to be overwhelmingly
male, which will likely lead to a persistent skew tow ard m ale talent.
An exam ple of a subtler indirect bias resulting from informal
rules relates to the m yth of the sole creator discussed above.151 This
may seem on its face to be ju st about the n atu re of creation, not the
identity of the creators. The norm m ight be an anticollaboration
norm or it m ight be a m eans of concentrating control of collabora
tion. B ut there is significant evidence th a t th is m yth contains and
enforces gender bias.152
145. See infra Part IV.B.l.
146. See Darnell Hunt & Ana -Christina R amon, Ralph J. B unche Ctr . for A frican
Am . S tudies at UCLA, 2015 Hollywood Diversity R eport 53-54 (2015), http://www.
bunchecenter.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015-Hollywood-Diversity-Report-2-2515.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9JM-VWPL].
147. See id.
148. See id. (finding evidence of bias in film industry hiring practices even though no
interviewee admitted to gender or racial bias).
149. See id. at 1 (documenting widespread underrepresentation of minorities and women
in the entertainment industry).
150. S tephen F ollows, G ender Within F ilm Crews 2 (2014), http://stephenfollows.com/
hg4h4/Gender_Within_Film_Crews-stephenfollows_com.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DVA-39XE]
(providing data on film crews on the 2000 highest grossing films from 1994 to 2013).
151. See Tushnet, supra note 55, at 296. Others might include norms about the quality of
certain types of art such as fan fiction or romance novels. See id. at 298.
152. See id. at 295-96, 296 n.5 (collecting sources and noting the existence of gender bias
in broader norms within the copyright space).

1824

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1793

This fact has not been lost on those in the creative industries.
Taylor Swift, Solange Knowles, and Bjork have all been criticized for
not producing their work all on th e ir own—these critiques unfairly
targ et female a rtists.153 A recent controversy in the music industry
highlighted the gendered n atu re of the sole-creator myth. After Beck
won his 2015 Album of the Y ear Grammy, Kanye W est challenged
him to give it to Beyonce because Beyonce possessed more
“artistry.”154 W ithin a few days, Beck defenders argued th a t he was
more deserving of the aw ard th a n Beyonce because “Beyonce used
a team of 25 w riters and 16 producers [ ]. Beck ju s t one: himself.”155
Some w ent on to note th a t Beck even “sang and played 17 in stru 
m ents” while “Beyonce [merely] sang.”156 The im plication was th a t
Beck was a real a rtis t because he was a sole creator.157 As this
meme spread, a backlash arose th a t rightly criticized Beck support
ers for m isunderstanding the m eaning of a rtistry and im porting the
sole-creator m yth w ith its gendered undertones.158
One final consideration is the effect of reputation penalties on
hold-up. While th re a ts to breach a contract can create valuable
incentives for parties to perform, they can also create hold-up value
if one party th reaten s to breach after the other h as committed
resources to relationship-specific investm ents.159 R eputation is no
different. A th re a t to destroy someone’s reputation is as much a
153. See Forrest Wickman, It’s Not Just Bjork: Women Are Tired of Not Getting Credit for
Their Own Music, S late: Browbeat (Jan. 21, 2015, 8:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
browbeat/2015/01/21/bjork_pitchfork_interview_she_s_tired of_not_getting credit_for_her
_music.html [https://perma.cc/B6NF-Q69K].
154. See Peter Vincent, Grammys 2015 Comment: Beck Trumps Beyonce for Artistry,
Sydney Morning H erald (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/grammys/
gram m ys-2015-com m ent-beck-trum ps-beyonce-for-artistry-20150210-13afqb.htm l
[https://perma.cc/PW4H-MBUW].
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., id. Similarly, BuzzFeed provided live reasons why Beck beat Beyonce,
including as number three (under the heading “His ‘artistry”’) a list of the twenty-live writers
on Beyonce’s album next to Beck’s name all by itself, and as number four (under the heading
“His ‘artistry’ (again)”) a picture of fourteen instruments that Beck played on his album next
to a lone microphone for Beyonce. Jack Shepherd, 5 Reasons Why Beck Beat Beyonce,
Buzz F eed (Feb. 9, 2015, 3:23 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/expresident/why-beck-beatbeyonce [https://perma.cc/79HF-DV5Z].
157. See Vincent, supra note 154.
158. See, e.g., Darren Levin, Stop Questioning Beyonce’s Artistry to Make a Point
About Beck, F aster L ouder (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.fasterlouder.com/Stop-questioningbeyonces-artistry-to-make-a-point-about-beck/84202z [https://perma.cc/YHL5-KEVW].
159. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1691-92.
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hold-up threat as a threat to terminate a supply contract. This is to
say that just as contracts are incomplete, so too are mechanisms for
enforcing informal rules.
B. The Special Case of Creative Collaboration Managed by
External Informal Rules
Ownership and authorship are often conflated in ways that cloud
analysis of copyright law . 160 For formal copyright law, the key
question is who owns the creative products. 161 Doctrines that tie
ownership to authorship misunderstand the nature of collaborative
creativity and the role that ownership plays in creating a hierarchy
to facilitate collaboration. 162 In prior work, we argued that the law
ought to emphasize ownership and control, even at the expense of
traditional notions of authorship . 163
Here we go further—even legal ownership and control often
cannot be neatly linked . 164 Reputation and trust frequently control
creative production regardless of who owns the creative product. In
those cases, formal law may not be doing much to allocate control. 165
Instead, when control cannot be found in hierarchical firms,
management might be disaggregated such that networks of
relationships governed by informal rules perform important
managerial functions. 166
Thus, in addition to offering tools for a manager overseeing a
hierarchical creative collaboration, reputation and trust might
themselves allow for informal rules to substitute for the role of a
manager in collaborative endeavors. While the team production
theory of the firm emphasizes the need for a manager to observe
inputs or enforce reward and punishment agreements when market

160. See id. at 1688.
161. See id. at 1686.
162. See id.; see also Balganesh, supra note 61, at 1684; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note
55, at 1019, 1022-23; Fisk, supra note 16, at 54.
163. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1718, 1721, 1724-25.
164. See infra P art FV.A.
165. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
166. On network governance theories in general, see Bernstein, supra note 122, at 599-607;
Candace Jones et al., A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and
Social Mechanisms, 22 A cad. M gmt . R ev . 911 (1997).
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contracting is not possible,167 it is plausible that, under certain
conditions, a manager is not required at all. Instead, informal rules
backed by reputation and trust perform the monitoring or enforce
ment functions ordinarily performed by a manager. This creates a
form of network governance.168
Informal rules can substitute for a managerial hierarchy because
the reputation of the team as a whole provides the binding mecha
nism. If a team never works and collapses in bickering, the world is
likely to see this. Outsiders may have no way of observing or
verifying which team members caused the collapse. But they do
know at least that the team failed to produce. This harms the
reputation of all team members, providing an ex post penalty to the
entire group—the team that produces a bad movie bears a collective
reputational hit.169 In these scenarios, a manager is unnecessary—
informal rules, enforced through reputation by a kind of network
governance, fill the manager’s role instead.170
167. See Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 325.
168. Theories of network governance have been explored deeply in the management and
sociology disciplines but less so in legal scholarship. Lisa Bernstein has recently provided an
analysis of law and network governance in manufacturing industries. Bernstein, supra note
122, at 599-607. In part we are making a similar contribution to industries in the copyright
space. Worthy of note is that the framework for network governance is dramatically different
in the two contexts. Where the creative networks th at enforce informal rules are themselves
structured and created by informal networks (contracts do not specify how the network will
be connected or the rules it will follow), Bernstein finds th at some manufacturing industries
have complicated contracts that form the framework and reference points for their network
governance. Id. at 563. The network that enforces the informal rules has behind it detailed
formal contracts th at provide an idea of what is acceptable behavior. Id. at 562-63. We suspect
that the difference lies in the four factors we have identified throughout this Article. Where
observability, verifiability, allocation, and certainty are low (as they are for creative produc
tion), it is even more difficult to use formal law and contracting as the backbone for creating
or guiding a network. See supra Part II. The same is not true in the manufacturing industries.
169. See Jones et al., supra note 166, at 931-32 (describing collective sanctions that can be
imposed on industries, including film). Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti describe this phen
omenon with an anecdote about the film failure of Heaven's Gate. Id. at 931. The movie’s
extraordinary failure resulted in a sanction such that virtually the entire team was excluded
from the film industry for some period of time. Id. Something like this may also explain the
career trajectories of some of the participants involved in other notorious flops like Cutthroat
Island. See Ti Singh, Looking Back at Cutthroat Island, Den of Geek (Apr. 7, 2011), http://
www.denofgeek.com/movies/17303/looking-back-at-cutthroat-island [https://perma.cc/PKA7HLAA] (referring to the movie as a “box office failure” and blaming it for “having destroyed
the careers of almost all those involved in its production”).
170. A simpler version of this may also encourage positive team behavior without a
manager when the team members fear a trust or reputation sanction directly from the other
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The threat of this industry-imposed reputational penalty may
create an ex ante incentive for all parties to perform in the collabo
ration. This can be understood as a form of the group penalty that
Bengt Holmstrom identified as a prime facilitator of team produc
tion . 171 The penalty would be self-executing and, indeed, may be an
example of penalty enforcement that can exist without an actual
manager in place.
We do not suggest that such a phenomenon is unique to copy
right . 172 We do, however, suggest that it is particularly widespread
throughout industries regulated by copyright law. Informal rules
flourish when there are thick relationships with repeated interac
tions within a given community. 173 Expressive creation is perva
sively collaborative—thus requiring such thick relationships with
those repeated and close interactions . 171 And formal law is a weak
tool for facilitating that collaboration. 175 Because ownership is a
construct of formal law that does not track the relationships at the
heart of creative collaboration, it cannot provide the control rights
that are necessary for organizing production, even in core copyright
spaces.
What matters in creative production is actual control, which
cannot be fully allocated by legal ownership or by contract. Formal
law can provide mechanisms that managers use to increase control

members of the team. Cf. Macaulay, supra note 32, at 63.
171. See Holmstrom, supra note 64, at 338-39.
172. Examples of nonintegrated, noncontractual relationships that function like a Coasean
hierarchy can be found in many industries. See, e.g., E l u CKSON, supra note 32, at 209-10
(illustrating nonlegal sanctions employed by ranchers and orchardmen); Bernstein, supra note
122, at 566-72 (analyzing relationships between original equipment manufacturers and their
suppliers); Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of “Team”Production of
Corporate Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 365, 376-83 (2015) (providing examples of
creditor control of corporate governance); Macaulay, supra note 32, at 62-64 (discussing
various nonlegal sanctions which fill gaps in contractual relationships).
173. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
174. Others have also suggested that uncertainty and volatility lead to repeat interactions.
See, e.g.. Faulkner & Anderson, supra note 89, at 892 (providing evidence on the uncertainty
of, and recurrent relationships in, the film industry). Some of the underlying causes of such
uncertainty can arise from the creative nature of the projects we discuss in this Article. Id.
at 884.
175. See supra Part II.C.
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on the margins.176 But it cannot sufficiently allocate the control
rights necessary to create a film, a play, or communal folklore.
For example, a contract might say that a producer “owns” the
rights of final cut—that is, formal law grants the producer the right
to decide when the film is done. The truth, though, is more complex.
Perhaps, in any given instance, a producer can, in principle, exercise
her final cut rights. But it is also true that doing so may be her last
act as a producer who has access to any talent in the film
industry.177 It is then just as true as a practical matter to say that
the film industry or the Hollywood network as a whole has residual
control over the final cut.
This is why a producer who provides creative inputs can be
trusted to act appropriately even though that producer ostensibly
sits at the top of the hierarchical firm making the film. In reality,
the hierarchy has additional levels above and outside of the
firm—the managerial function is disaggregated, with some elements
remaining within the firm (for example, allocating revenues
generated by the film or deciding when the film is complete) and
others distributed throughout the community (for example,
allocating reputational rewards associated with the film or punish
ing misuse of final cut authority).
IV. P r a c t ic a l I m p l ic a t io n s o f F o r m a l L a w a n d I n f o r m a l
R u l e s f o r C r e a t iv e C o l l a b o r a t io n s

Even in contexts where informal rules generally facilitate creative
collaborations—as we think they do in the American television and
film industries—there will nonetheless be particular instances
where, for one reason or another, collaborations fail. When they do,
formal law and informal rules at the intersection of authorship,
ownership, and control may attempt to mediate the conflict. In this
Part, we apply our framework to illustrate the possible interactions
between formal law and informal rules. We also identify some trade
offs involved in regulating the organization of creative collaboration.

176. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1723-24, 1729-30 (discussing the work-madefor-hire doctrine and the derivative works right).
177. See supra note 128.
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A. When Informal Rules Fail: Garcia and Merkin
Copyright law contains two primary mechanisms to deal with
creative works that are the product of contributions from multiple
creative inputs. The default mechanism is the joint-works rule,
which applies to works “prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole. ” 178 In these instances, each
“author” is a co-owner of the copyright in the work. 179 Parties may,
however, avoid this co-ownership default through the work-madefor-hire doctrine, which provides that contributors to a creative
work may contractually assign their authorship (and resulting
ownership), thus allowing parties to opt into consolidated author
ship, ownership, and control. 180
Difficult problems arise when the parties fail to opt into the workmade-for-hire-regime, and the joint-works rule does not cleanly
apply. Among other scenarios, this can occur when creative inputs
disagree about what, precisely, the “work” is . 181 The director and
producer of a film may, for example, disagree about whether a given
scene should be included in the completed version. In such a case,
there will be two films: one including the director’s scene and the
other including the producer’s scene.
Formal copyright law may have trouble resolving these disagree
ments in a satisfying way because the law is designed on the
assumption that the parties agree about what the “work” is . 182
178. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
179. Id. § 201(a).
180. Id. §§ 101, 201(b).
181. For another scenario, see Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). In that
case, the question was not which of two competing versions of the work prevailed, but who
was entitled to control the value of an agreed-upon version. Id. at 1230. Like Garcia and
Merkin, though, the court dismissed the copyrightable contributions of one of the creative
inputs to the collaboration in favor of consolidating control through formal law. Id. at 1235-36.
And it similarly implied that the work-made-for-hire doctrine’s requirement of an agreement
in the case of nonemployee contributors is a dead letter. See id. at 1235 (reasoning th at by
requiring the film director, but not those working under his control, to sign a “work for hire”
agreement, the studio intended to retain sole authorship).
182. Defining the “work” for purposes of copyright law is a complex and undertheorized
problem. See Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 5-7), https://ssm.com/abstract=2860914 [https://
perma.cc/22AH-9KZ2].
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Form al copyright law perm its only the “au th o r” of the work to
decide w hether a particular scene makes it in .183 B ut it determ ines
who is the author by looking to who has the authority to decide
w hether a particular scene m akes it in.184 The question in the
toughest cases is which of two plausible works—each w ith its own
supporters w ithin the collaboration—prevails. Form al law becomes
circular w hen the question of which version prevails is answ ered by
determ ining who decides which version prevails, and the question
of who decides which version prevails depends on which version is
being assessed.
To see how this problem plays out, consider two recent cases
presenting precisely those scenarios. In Garcia v. Google, Inc., Cindy
Garcia was cast for a cameo in w hat she thought was an actionadventure film titled Desert Warrior; it tu rn ed out th a t th e film was
“an anti-Islam polemic renam ed Innocence o f M uslim s.”185 G arcia’s
lines had been dubbed over so she appeared to say “Is your M oham
med a child molester?”18b W hen the film was released on YouTube,
G arcia received death th reats, and she sued Google and the
film m aker, M ark Basseley Youssef, for copyright infringem ent,
seeking an injunction preventing the distribution of any version of
the film th a t included her perform ance.187 Garcia argued th a t she
was the sole author of a standalone copyright in h er “perfor
mance.”188 In effect, she sought to define the work as consisting
solely of h er contribution to the scene in which she participated;
Youssef, m eanwhile, sought to define the work as the entire film.189
The N inth Circuit en banc sided w ith Y oussef’s definition of the
w ork.190 A pparently adopting the Copyright Office’s view th a t the
183. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (conferring ownership in a “joint work” only to “authors”).
184. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233-34 (evaluating authorship of a work by
determining which party has “artistic control” or “decision making authority”).
185. 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 737-38.
188. Id. at 741; see also F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship
of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLAL. Rev. 225, 300-06 (2001) (arguing
that actors in a film “could be considered the authors of the original expressive aspects of their
performances in a motion picture”).
189. Youssef himself did not participate in the litigation. See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 735
(appeal litigated by Google, Inc.). But we can take the version of the film he released on
YouTube as the version of the work that he deemed final.
190. Id. at 740.
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production of a motion picture results in only one copyrightable
work, 191 the court noted first that a “performance” does not fall
within the statutory list of examples of “works of authorship .” 192
Moreover, Garcia did not contribute more than a “minimal level of
creativity or originality” when she performed her part . 193 As a result,
her performance was not a “work of authorship” to which copyright
might attach . 194 And to the extent that anything incorporating her
performance was a “work” entitled to copyright protection, she was
not its author because she was not the person under whose author
ity that larger work was fixed. 195
Note, however, the circularity. The underlying question the court
had to resolve was whether Garcia or Youssef had the right to
decide whether Innocence of Muslims would include Garcia’s
scene. 196 In order to answer that question, the court had to identify
the author of the work. But it could not identify the author without
first deciding what was the relevant work. 197
The Garcia court’s holding was perhaps sensible in the context of
a five-second cameo performance. It seems untenable to conclude,
as the dissent apparently implied, that every contributor in a film,
no matter how small the contribution, has joint control over the
final product. 198 That would be a strange rule even if it were simply
a default where parties can opt out. The more efficient rule is the
one we think parties would overwhelmingly adopt: no control to the
minor actor who speaks two lines for five seconds.
But the court’s reasoning was problematic for at least two
reasons. First, as the dissent pointed out, the court suggested that
191. Id. at 741.
192. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
193. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742 (quoting Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir.
2000 )).

194. Id. at 741.
195. Id. at 743-44.
196. Id. at 743 & n.12.
197. If the work were a version of Innocence of Muslims without Garcia’s scene, then
Youssef could not have been the author because he wanted that scene in. See supra notes 18384 and accompanying text. If the relevant work was—as the court ultimately viewed it—a
version of Innocence of Muslims including Garcia’s scene, then Garcia could not be the author;
after all, her argument was that she did not want her scene in the film, and her inability to
excise it from the work as a whole was what led her to seek relief in court. See supra notes
183-84 and accompanying text.
198. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743.
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a filmed scene for a film is not a copyrightable “work.”199 It did not,
however, tell us a t w hat point in filming or editing something
transform s from a separate input into the joint output: th e ultim ate
work itself. Does this mean, the dissent asked, th a t every outtake
of a film and every draft chapter of a book are fair game for
copying?200 T hat cannot be tru e.201
Second, the court’s holding th a t Garcia was not entitled to any
copyright interests in her work left little room for th e work-madefor-hire doctrine.202 In the presence of an appropriate agreem ent,
th a t doctrine would tak e copyright ownership out of the actor’s
hands and p u t it in the director’s (or producer’s).203 B ut here there
was no work-made-for-hire agreem ent, and ow nership was still
taken out of the actor’s hands and put into th e director’s.204 T hat
seems to render the statutory requirem ent of an agreem ent (for
nonemployee contributors like Garcia) a dead letter.
The difficulty is th a t formal law presents untenable options.
E ither input providers are not creating copyrightable works, in
which case those providers get nothing, or every input provider is an
author w ith control over any final product th a t includes the inputs.
These options replicate neither the in ten t of the parties involved in
most film relationships nor any hypothetical efficient transaction.
The reason for the disconnect is th a t most relationships in the
film industry have deep and nuanced term s th a t are set by and
enforced through inform al rules th a t respond to the problems of
collaborative creative production.205 Form al law can do no b etter

199. Id. at 749-50 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 750.
201. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or
phonorecord for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of
it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of th at time, and where
the work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.”).
202. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 751 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Actors usually sign away their
rights when contracting to do a movie, but Garcia didn’t and she wasn’t Youssef’s employee.”).
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire”). The doctrine can also apply in the
absence of an agreement to scenarios in which an employee performs work within the scope
of employment, but those kinds of scenarios would not apply in the ordinary film context. See
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1989) (limiting the application
of the work-made-for-hire doctrine in the absence of an agreement to scenarios in which “a
hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency”).
204. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744.
205. See Jones et al., supra note 166, at 933.
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than those rules, and that is why the parties opt for informal rules
instead.200
We do not mean to suggest that the arrangements in Garcia were
part of the normal film industry. Perhaps it is precisely because
Garcia and Youssef were operating so far outside the reach of the
industry’s informal rules that the dispute arose. Indeed, an optimist
might suggest that Garcia’s impact will be limited because disputes
in the normal film industry will be resolved by resort to informal
rules.207 But the formal law developed in the case now nominally
applies as the formal law of the normal film industry, and there is
a risk that industry participants may opportunistically resort to it
in particular disputes. That is what makes the reasoning potentially
harmful.
To see the problems caused by clashes between formal law and
informal rules in more typical settings, consider the Second Cir
cuit’s recent decision in 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin.208 Robert
Krakovski, the owner, operator, and principal of 16 Casa Duse, LLC,
bought the rights to the screenplay Heads Up.209 He asked Alex
Merkin to direct the film.210Throughout production, Krakovski and
206. See supra P art II.
207. See Fisk, supra note 16, at 70 (noting that, according to “anecdotal reports,” inventors
resort to the formal patent law of inventorship “only when the norms-based system [of
attribution] breaks down”).
208. 791 F.3d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir. 2015). Because the informal rules are so pervasive and
powerful, few disputes involving major industry participants will reach the point at which a
court of appeals issues an opinion. Indeed, most of the disputes will be resolved within the
industry itself. Still, in at least some cases, the disputes will at least spill into the public eye,
even if they do not reach the courts of appeals. For some recent examples, see Michael Cieply,
‘L ondon Fields’ Premiere in Toronto Troubled by Creative Rift, N.Y. T im e s (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/business/media/london-fields-premiere-toronto-troubledby-creative-rift.html [https://perma.cc/DJ4Z-B233] (describing fight between director and
producer regarding which version of the film is suited for distribution); see also Eriq Gardner,
Director of Nina Simone Film Sues Over Production Company’s Hijacking (Exclusive),
HOLLYWOOD R e p . (May 14, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/
director-nina-simone-film-sues-704230 [https://perma.cc/G7FF-4FRR] (describingfilmmaker’s
allegations that production company improperly took control of editing film). For an older
example, see the disputes regarding Blade Runner. See Wil McCarthy, Do Filmgoers Dream
of Director’s Cuts?, Sci Fi W e e k l y (Oct. 15, 2007), http://web.archive.org/web/200903190
34524/http://www.scifi.com/sfw/column/sfwl7153.html [https://perma.cc/KA39-Z56F]. The
judicial resolution of cases like Garcia and Merkin will be problematic because they will shape
how other disputes are resolved by informal rules even when they do not reach the courts. See
infra Part IV.B.
209. See Merkin, 791 F.3d at 251.
210. See id.
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M erkin negotiated a work-made-for-hire contract, bu t they u lti
m ately could not agree.211 As the dispute developed, th ere came to
be a t least two, and perhaps three, versions of th e movie: (1) the raw
footage shot by Merkin; (2) an edited version completed by an editor
retained by Krakovski; and (3) (perhaps) an edited version cut by
M erkin.212
Eventually, Krakovski sued M erkin, seeking a declaratory
judgm ent th a t 16 C asa Duse was not liable for copyright infringe
m ent and th a t M erkin had no copyright in terest in the film.213 The
parties agreed th a t M erkin was not a joint author of th e Krakovski
version and th a t the work-made-for-hire provision did not apply.214
The case th u s explicitly posed the question: w hat, precisely, is the
work of authorship to which copyright protection attaches?215
The court’s analysis appeared to tre a t the raw footage as the locus
of w hatever copyright protection arose from M erkin’s and Krakovski’s collaboration.216 According to the court, because none of the
multiple au thor scenarios contem plated by th e Copyright Act ap 
plied, the answ er as to who owned the copyright in the raw footage
turned on which party represented the “dom inant author.”217
T hat inquiry, however, would not be answ ered by investigating
which of the putative authors occupied the m asterm ind role with
respect to creative decisions; instead, the Merkin court looked for
which of the p arties could best be understood as the m anager in the

211. See id.
212. See id. at 251-53.
213. See id. at 253. Merkin also argued that he owned a separate copyright in his
directorial contributions. The court reasoned that individual creative contributions to a
collaborative work could not be “works of authorship” entitled to protection. See id. at 257.
This analysis was based on statutory interpretation that was neither obvious nor inevitable
and further reflects courts’ tendencies to concentrate on authorship, ownership, and control.
See id. at 256-57. Because it largely tracks the Garcia court’s analysis of Garcia’s claim to
copyright in her performance, we say no more here. Cf. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733,
741 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
214. See Merkin, 791 F.3d at 255-56.
215. See id. at 256.
216. See id. at 259-60 (noting Merkin’s contention that ‘h e and not Casa Duse owns all
copyright interests in the ‘raw film footage,”’ recognizing that “the film footage is subject to
copyright protection,” reasoning th at the “unedited film footage” was “the portion of [the work]
that ha[d] been fixed at [this] particular time,” and proceeding to evaluate “the ownership of
any such copyright”).
217. See id. at 261.
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team production sense . 218 Thus, although “Merkin exercised a sig
nificant degree of control over many of the creative decisions,”
including “decisions related to camera work, lighting, blocking, and
actors’ wardrobe, makeup, and dialogue delivery,” Krakovski
prevailed because he “initiated the project; acquired the rights to
the screenplay; selected the cast, crew and director; controlled the
production schedule; and coordinated (or attempted to coordinate)
the film’s publicity and release .” 219 Krakovski appears to have made
none of the creative decisions we typically associate with the
author’s role in the production of expressive works—he did not write
the story, perform the roles, guide the actors in their interpretation
of the text, or decide how to frame a shot.220 Instead, he did what a
team production manager would do: decided the scope of the project
and determined membership in the team . 221
The outcome may be a reasonable resolution of the circumstances
in this particular case . 222 But the legal doctrines that got the court
to its outcome are troubling and may frustrate the parties’ desired
relationships if applied in other cases. 223 The court created the
fiction of a dominant author and then that label was bestowed on
the party exercising the fewest acts of creative authorship . 224 It had
to do this to consolidate formal ownership and authorship, as formal
law insists, even though the parties did not contract for such neat
consolidation on their own. 225
Underlying these cases is the subtle question of competing visions
of a work. 226 Both Garcia and Merkin rejected claims to authorship
in part because the claimants did not have the authority to say what
the work was. 227 In Garcia, Cindy Garcia had no ability to say
whether her scene would be part of the film, or even what she would
be saying in that scene. 228 In Merkin, Casa Duse was the one that
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See id. at 260.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 264-65.
See id. at 260.
See id.
See id. at 252.
See id. at 260; Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786. F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
See Merkin, 791 F.3d at 260; Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742.
See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 737.
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determ ined w hat story would be told, and th a t sufficed to establish
its claim to authorship statu s under formal copyright law (as well
as the ownership and control th a t followed).229
But these opinions elide the deeper question about w hat happens
when collaborators disagree about which story is going to be told.230
This question lurks beneath the surface of M erkin,231 If our focus is
on the raw footage, it seems plausible, if not inevitable, to th in k th a t
Krakovski would be the author.232 The version edited by M erkin,
however, seems of a different sort—in w hat way can we view
Krakovski as the author of a version of the film th a t he did not
approve of?233 Perhaps M erkin’s version of the film infringes on
K rakovski’s, raising again the old Anderson question of w hat
happens to the original portions of an unauthorized derivative
work.234 But it is h ard to view Krakovski as the au th o r of a version
of the film th a t he does not believe should exist a t all.235 Formal law
does not offer a satisfying way out of this puzzle.236 Again, optim ists
may suggest th a t industry participants will avoid resorting to courts
precisely because formal law is unsatisfying. But we worry th a t
frustrated team m embers trying to push th eir visions a t the expense
of collaborators may try to exert dominance through formal law
after being denied (or because they anticipate being denied) by
inform al rules.

229. See Merkin, 791 F.3d at 260.
230. See id. at 252.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 260.
233. See id. at 252.
234. See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
25, 1989). For commentary on the Anderson issue, see Dougherty, supra note 188, at 250-51;
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev.
989, 1074-77 (1997).
235. See Merkin, 791 F.3d at 252.
236. See infra Part IV.B; see also Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Author
ship, 102VA.L. Rev. 1229, 1234 (2016) (recognizing th at “[ajuthorship questions are ... at the
heart o f... Garcia ... and ... Merkin”).

2017]

THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION

1837

B. When Informal Rules Work
1. Anecdotes from Industry Participants237
In most industries where creative collaboration is pervasive,
informal rules will usually work well enough. For example, several
independent film producers have reported th a t inform al rules at
least sometimes regulate the organization of creative collaboration.
In these cases, rights to ideas were allocated not by confidentiality
agreem ents and subm ission releases, bu t by reputation—often
filtered through interm ediaries in the form of agents and m anag
ers—and by trust.
Thus, pitches for proposed films took place informally between
film m akers and producers who either knew each other personally
or were introduced to each other by a tru sted th ird party (usually an
agent, but sometimes another producer) who could vouch for the
behavior of the film m aker .238 Similarly, the producers described a
system where perform ance obligations of actors, w riters, and
directors were controlled alm ost exclusively by industry expecta
tions . 239 Bad behavior—for example, rejecting suggested revisions
w ithout adequately considering them , allocating insufficient tim e to
the project, or storm ing off the set—resulted in penalties applied
through reputation and tru st, ra th e r th a n through formal legal
action. Producers communicated w ith each other about which actors
work well in team s, which w riters produce w eak drafts, and which
directors poison the environm ent on the se t .240
Producers them selves were som etim es bound little by their
contracts bu t greatly by community restrain ts. Thus, contract often
allocated final cut rights to producers ra th e r th a n film m akers, bu t
23V. The description in the following Sections is based on conversations we have had with
producers in the independent film industry and an editor in the literary incubator industry.
Like the reported cases discussed above, these are anecdotal examples to demonstrate how
the mechanisms we have discussed might work in practice. Interview with Editor and
Literary Incubator Exec, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 28, 2011); Telephone Interview with Producer
and Prod. Co. Exec., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 26, 2014); Telephone Interview with Producer and
Prod. Co. Exec., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Dec. 3, 2014) [hereinafterDec. 3,2014, Interview]; Telephone
Interview with Producer and Prod. Co. Exec, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Jan
9, 2015, Interview]. Notes from all interviews are on file with the authors.
238. See sources cited supra note 237.
239. See sources cited supra note 237.
240. See sources cited supra note 237.
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producers felt th a t inform al rules prevented them from exercising
those rights in all but the most extrem e circum stances.241 Im prop
erly exercising final cut privileges would resu lt in severe rep u tatio n 
al penalties and a concomitant inability to a ttra c t new talen t.242 So
in practice, film m akers frequently had significant power over final
cut.
Im portantly, the contracts in these cases did not provide th a t the
film m akers got to decide when a film was done. And they did not
provide th a t the right transfers to the producers only in circum 
stances involving wrongdoing by the film m aker.243 But the relation
ships functioned as if those term s were included. In this way, an
inform al rule—and not the formal law of contract—dictated the
most central organization for creative control.244

2. Reputation Networks and Agents as Reputation
Intermediaries
The m echanism s we have discussed require strong social n e t
works. P articipants in the film industry cannot rely on reputation
unless reputational inform ation can be tran sm itted at a reasonable
cost. One producer told us, unsurprisingly, th a t much of this is fa
cilitated through industry relationships th a t are developed through

241. See sources cited supra note 237.
242. See sources cited supra note 237.
243. In cases when a very powerful filmmaker obtains final cut rights, those rights are
often conditioned on the filmmaker satisfying various obligations; even so, disputes regarding
final cut in those instances are rarely resolved by reference to contractual language. See
Tatiana Siegel, Fade-Out on Final Cut Privileges?, VARIETY (Jan. 22, 2010, 1:22 PM), http://
variety.com/2010/film/news/fade-out-on-final-cut-privileges-l 118014187/ [https://perma.ee/
X6TX-92DDJ (quoting a “studio chief’ as saying that “[e]ven if you can find a way th at they
are in breach (of their contractual delivery terms), you are more than hesitant to take
advantage. Putting aside what the contract says, you’re not going to take on Baz [Lurhmann]
and take on that PR nightmare.” (emphasis added)).
244. The producers reported similar attributes in the organization of their relationships
with writers. See sources cited supra note 237. Our conversation with a participant in the
literary-incubator (or book-packaging industry) similarly indicated that informal rules play
crucial roles in organizing creative collaborations. Interview with Editor and Literary
Incubator Exec., supra note 237. When a group of authors brainstorms ideas for novels, there
is a risk that an author will use the sessions to improve her own ideas and then defect from
the group, taking her ideas with her. Instead, an informal rule dictates th at any ideas
disclosed during a session belong to the group. Id.
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social events. 245 We suspect that talent agents are crucial to these
networks.
Talent agents are often viewed with some skepticism. Providing
the inspiration for such unlikeable characters as Ari Gold on
Entourage, 246 the agents nonetheless appear to occupy the central
role of reputation repositories or intermediaries. Agents can develop
trust with both the talent and the producers who may hire the
talent .247 In this way they can connect two players who would
otherwise have no basis for trusting each other.
The intermediary role of the agent can add value in the following
way. A producer may want to know if an actor is creatively talented
and a team player. 248 Evaluating creative talent depends on largely
accessible information—the actor’s body of work can be viewed and
judged (if producers are expert evaluators of talent ) . 249 But evaluat
ing whether an actor is a team player depends on largely inaccessi
ble information—the actor’s private interactions with other actors,
directors, and writers cannot be streamed on Netflix.
An agent, however, may specialize in aggregating information on
both characteristics, and for many players. The agent can access
private information about whether someone is a team player by
serving as a trusted repository for it. An effective agent should be
expected to know which producers can work well with which
245. Dec. 3, 2014, Interview, supra note 237. As he put it, when you are assessing
someone’s potential, first you talk to agents, and then you get on the phone to call your
industry friends, “which are different from your real friends.” Id. The information gathered
from these networks likely has dramatic effects. One producer told us th at a director with
whom he worked proved to be extremely difficult in the editing room. When the producer later
received a call from a colleague interested in hiring the filmmaker, the producer told him to
stay as far away as possible. The filmmaker was not hired. Jan. 9, 2015, Interview, supra note
237. Of course, nothing is absolute. The same producer told us of a filmmaker who effectively
walked off the set. Although her prior film was widely lauded, the producer said th at this
behavior would likely mean that no producer would hire her. He noted, however, th at it was
a hard case because the person “might be so good that it is worth taking on the risk in the
future.” Id. In that instance, the talent’s misbehavior had reduced her value, but perhaps not
to zero.
2 4 6 . See Entourage (2015), H i s t . VS. HOLLYWOOD, http://www.historyvshollywood.com/
reelfaces/entourage/ [https://perma.cc/HL3C-EA5W].
247. See supra Part IV.B.l.
248. See sources cited supra note 237.
249. This is subject to the constraint that, for any given film, value cannot be easily
allocated to a particular input. That said, producers may be expert allocators, and they may
be able to evaluate over an entire body of work what cannot be done for any given work.
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directors, which w riters work well w ith micro-m anaging producers
and which work well w hen left alone, which directors will work well
w ith which big talent, and which casting specialists know how to fill
out the re st of the team . And because the agent will work w ith an
actor (or w riter or casting specialist) on all projects, while a
producer will work w ith an actor on only a subset of projects (and
perhaps only one), the agent is b etter able to spread the costs of
acquiring inform ation across all of an actor’s projects. Thus, a
producer need only keep in mind which agents are known to be
trustw orthy inform ation repositories.
On the other side of things, the agents can aggregate inform ation
about producers for the ta le n t providers. This provides both
inform ation and a bonding m echanism by which producers can
commit to good behavior. M istreatm ent of talen t—even if it is not
legally actionable—will lead to a report to the agent. The agent can
then collect this inform ation and eith er pass it on to others in the
industry or simply refuse to refer top talen t to the producer in the
future.
Moreover, the agents can also police the equality of treatm en t.250
While any given actor or director may not know how h er peers are
being treated by producers, the agents have a good sense.251 If the
producer is suggesting conditions or perks th a t are not commensu
rate w ith industry standards, the agent will have a sense of this and
can push back on the producer.252
In all of this, one thing will be conspicuously absent: the contract
term .253 An agent who gets it wrong will not be sued for breach. A
250. See supra Part IV.B.l.
251. See sources cited supra note 237.
252. This looks a lot like network governance and information sharing in other contexts.
See Jones et al., supra note 166, at 911-12. For example, in manufacturing, firms that make
large relationship-specific investments seek ways to bind each other to good behavior. See
Bernstein, supra note 122, at 564-65. In some cases, they go to great measures to create vast
interconnected networks of valuable business partnerships that create information channels
and reciprocal threat points. See id. at 603. Misbehavior by any one party can lead to a costly
expulsion from the networks. See id. at 603-04 (providing an in depth picture and analysis of
this phenomenon). In the film industry, the agent provides the connective tissue for the
network. See supra Part IV.B.l. The information resides in the agent and the agent has the
power to exclude players on either side from the network. See sources cited supra note 237.
That is not, however, to say that players cannot be excluded in other ways through other non
agent mechanisms.
253. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.

2017]

THE PROBLEM OF CREATIVE COLLABORATION

1841

writer whose draft strikes the wrong tone or who rejects suggestions
out of hand will not be taken to court. And a producer who abuses
final cut privileges will be (largely) immune from any legal action.
But these players all know that there is a code of conduct with
which they are expected to comply. 254
This is consistent with what has been found in other creative
industries. Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel, for example,
describe an instance in which a former employee of a famous chef
“presented one of the chef’s recipes on TV without proper attribu
tion .” 255 This violated an informal rule providing that a chef must
acknowledge the original source of a recipe. 256 But the famous chef
who created the recipe did not sue his former employee for violating
the rule; instead, the famous chef sent a letter admonishing the
former employee. 257 Critically, he sent this “letter to a number of his
colleagues, so that the community as a whole would learn of his
former employee’s violation.” 258
The letter—and the reputational implications it carried—enforced
the informal rule demanding attribution for creators. In the
Fauchart and von Hippel model, the attribution rule ensures that
chefs have sufficient incentives to produce new recipes.259 In the
absence of robust protection from formal intellectual property law,
chefs who produce new recipes would be unable to capture the
pecuniary rewards associated with those recipes because all other
chefs could copy the recipes. 260 But an informal rule requiring
attribution could permit chefs who produce new recipes to capture
nonpecuniary status rewards (and, possibly, subsequent pecuniary
rewards associated with increased status) by demanding community
recognition for the initial creator of a recipe. 261 In this way, informal
rules allocating status rewards to the creators of new works can
provide the motivation to produce such works.
While we do not reject their interpretation—indeed, we agree that
their model provides at least some explanatory power for their
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See supra Part IELA.
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 193.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 191.
See id. at 193.
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observations—we em phasize a distinct role for these informal
rules.21’2 In our model, the attribution rule facilitates the head chefs
role in organizing the creative collaboration th a t occurs in her
kitchen.263 Suppose the recipe is the result of creative inputs from
several (not too many) cooks in the kitchen. B ut it is h ard to avoid
shirking by the cooks in th a t kitchen team . The attrib u tio n rule
m ight vest the head chef w ith control over the statu s rew ards
associated w ith a particular recipe—other chefs interested in hiring
a cook can seek inform ation from the original chef about th e relative
contributions of team m em bers.264The attrib u tio n rule identifies the
repository of information, and the chef then uses h er control over
the reputational rew ards (and punishm ents) to elicit collaboration
from the cooks in the first instance.265
In these exam ples, the producer and th e chef are in positions to
dole out reputational rew ards and penalties. And, w hen doing so,
they use inform al rules to regulate in trateam behavior.266 If the
production of a recipe is a collaborative endeavor, w ith the head chef
a t the top of the hierarchy, then this ability to enforce penalties on
team m embers (even after the collaboration is over) is an im portant
way in which the chef can m anage the creative in p u ts.267
So in the F auchart and von Hippel model, informal rules provide
incentives for creative work by ensuring th a t the rig h t kitchen is
credited w ith a recipe. Credit then provides nonpecuniary rew ards
in the form of increased statu s or pecuniary rew ards. In our model,
the inform al rules allocate control to a head chef who can then
ensure th a t the right cooks w ithin a given kitchen receive rew ards
for th eir collaboration (or are punished for failing to collaborate).
C. Conflicts Between Formal Law and Informal Rules
Form al copyright law incorporates a rom antic view of the sole
author.268 This creates stark problems when non-W estern cultures
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See id. at 193-94.
See supra Part III.B.
Cf., e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 109, at 1393-94.
Cf., e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1815.
Cf. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 9, at 189.
See supra P art III.A. 1.
See Tushnet, supra note 55, at 294.
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clash with the sole author myth that drives Western copyright
law . 269 In such cases, formal law may be in tension with the work
that informal rules do (and vice versa), undermining types of
creative collaboration that function well under one regime but
poorly under another.
Litigation involving Australian Aboriginal art in Australia
provides a salient example of such clashes, pitting informal rules of
Aboriginal communal authorship and control that evolved over
centuries against a Western copyright law focused on the sole
author . 270 For example, the notable case of Bulun Bulun v. R & T
Textiles dealt with ownership of and control over a painting derived
from the communal folklore of an indigenous group, known as the
Ganalbingu . 271 Senior members of the Ganalbingu had, in accor
dance with their community’s standards, authorized John Bulun
Bulun to paint the artwork using elements of the Ganalbingu’s
sacred and ritual knowledge. 272 Textile producers then copied the
artwork onto fabric patterns . 273 While those producers admitted to
infringing Bulun Bulun’s rights, the representatives of the Gan
albingu claimed that the rights belonged to the Ganalbingu people
in common, not to Bulun Bulun in particular, and sued to vindicate
those rights . 274
An ordinary copyright analysis would have attempted to identify
an author-owner of the original aesthetic expression in the
painting . 275 But there were so many contributors over so many years
269. See id. at 296; see also Dougherty, supra note 188, at 277. It also incorporates stereo
types about artistic creativity that interact with romantic notions of authorship to jointly in
fluence copyright law. See Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Con
ceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. Davis L. R ev . 283, 315-31 (2010).
270. See Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 244, 246-47 (Austl.) (a
leading Aboriginal art case where the court was faced with the question of whether the rights
to a painting derived from communal folklore belonged to the community from which the
folklore had been developed); see also Daniela Simone, Dreaming Authorship: Copyright Ij i w
and the Protection of Indigenous Cultural Expressions, 37 E ur . I ntell .P rop . R ev. 240, 240-43
(2015).
271. 86 FCR at 246-47.
272. Id. at 251-52.
273. Id. at 252.
274. Id. at 246-47.
275. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991) (requiring
th a t a work be original—th at is, contain at least minimal creativity and not be copied—in
order to qualify for copyright protection); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879)
(extending copyright protection only to an expression, not to the underlying ideas).
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and w ith so m any variations th a t it would have been futile in this
case. And the inform al rules were clear th a t no single au th o r could
control the folklore; instead, these senior members of the Ganalbingu, chosen and acting in accordance w ith established community
standards, had the effective ability to perm it or prevent use of the
folklore.276 W estern notions of the sole author-ow ner of a creative
work cannot easily accommodate this type of collaboration.
In the end, the A ustralian court intuitively recognized th a t
control in this context was different from the W estern notion of
control.277 Enforcing legal rules of ow nership could not get the
control question right—the law on its face prohibited the informal
rules from playing any role a t all.278 The court recognized “[t]he
inadequacies of statutory rem edies under the Copyright Act as a
m eans of protecting communal ownership.”279 The court accordingly
concluded th a t Bulun Bulun—the individual p ain ter who physically
fixed the work in its tangible medium—not only had a copyright
(and the concomitant ability to prevent or authorize reproductions
of the painting), he also had a fiduciary duty to exercise his rights
to the benefit of the Aboriginal community.280 So while th e Aborigi
nal community did not have a copyright in its folklore, it did retain
some formal legal power: it could sue to enforce its inform al rules
against community m embers who create works based on th a t
folklore. Notably, however, the community appeared to have no
power over outsiders who m ight create works based on th a t folklore.
The outcome of the case leaves m any open questions, reflecting
the complexities th a t arise from overlaying rigid formal law on
inform al creative com m unities.281 The A ustralian court refused to
276. Bulun Bulun, 86 FCR at 262.
277. Id. at 257.
278. As one scholar has pointed out in this context, “copyright law remains committed to
a one-size-fits-all model of creativity that does not represent the variety of types of creativity
that flourish in the modem world.” Simone, supra note 270, at 250.
279. Bulun Bulun, 86 FCR at 247.
280. Id. at 262. In this particular case, because Bulun Bulun had already sued the
infringers, there was nothing left for the court to do. As a practical matter that meant that
the Ganalbingu people had no additional legal remedies. Id. at 263-64. It did, however,
provide some power for indigenous communities to protect their rights in the future.
281. Similar problems have been identified in other cultures. See David B. Jordan, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property Law and Native American Economic
and Cultural Policy: Can It Fit?, 25 Am. I ndian L. Rb:v. 93, 100 (2000-2001); see also Daniel
J. Gervais, Spiritual but Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible 'rraditional
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grant ownership of communal folklore to any party .282 It also
rejected calls to create a constructive trust that would have allowed
the community to control its communal folklore. 283 At the same time,
it invented a new fiduciary duty that forced members of the
community to protect the value of the communal folklore. 284 The
practical difference between creating a trust and creating a
fiduciary role is murky, but, as a formal legal matter, the fiduciary
duty merely defines the relationship between the community and its
members, while a trust would have required the court to take the
radical (from the perspective of Western copyright law) step of
allowing communal authorship to create a property right in art.28"
Surprisingly, however, our framework indicates that Bulun Bulun
is not as far from the core of Western copyright as it might seem.
Informal rules in the filmmaking community play a similar role to
that played by informal rules in Aboriginal communities—the
film m ak in g community dictates rules of control for the various
inputs into a film . 286 To put the point more radically, Western
notions of single authors and corporate legal personhood287 establish
our formal notion of who owns a film—the output of the creative
collaboration—and thereby (attempt to) influence the inputs to that
collaboration. 288 But the community’s informal rules have much
more to say about who controls the various aspects of that film and
Knowledge, 11 Cardozo J. I nt ’l & C om p . L. 467, 468-69, 475 (2003); Cortelyou C. Kenney,
Reframing Indigenous Cultural Artifacts Disputes: An Intellectual Property-Based Approach,
28 Cardozo Arts & E nt . L.J. 501, 526-27 (2011) (“Other countries including Panama,
Nigeria, Tunisia, and the Philippines have passed ‘copyright-like’ laws allowing, inter alia,
collective ownership of sacred indigenous objects, fee distribution to communities whose
folklore serves as a source for creative works, and the criminalization of ‘intentional
distortion’ and misuses of folklore.”); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern
Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and
Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 Am . U. L. R ev . 769, 793-96 (1999);
Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous
Communities, 18 Cardozo A rts & E nt . L.J. 175, 176-77 (2000); Rachael Grad, Note,
Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: A Comparison of the United States and
Australia, 13 Duke J. Com p . & I nt ’l L. 203, 225-26 (2003).
282. Bulun Bulun, 86 FCR at 258.
283. Id. at 258-60.
284. Id. at 264.
285. See Simone, supra note 270, at 245 (noting the adaptability of fiduciary duties relative
to constructive trusts).
286. See supra P art IV.B.l.
287. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 55, at 1040-41.
288. See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 30, at 1686.
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its inputs. The formal allocation of property ownership and contract
rights is significantly disconnected from the reality of control, and
the formal allocation will break down in situations where its
assum ptions about the creative process are violated, as they (likely)
were in Garcia and M erkin,289 Moreover, if th e formal laws were
completely different and vested “ow nership” of a film in the hands
of the film m aking community—in Hollywood as a legal person—we
doubt the re su ltan t use of those rights would look much different
th a n the statu s quo.290
A recent article by A braham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky
treads territory adjacent to th a t explored in B ulun B u lu n ,291 In th eir
provocative and thorough study of the area, Bell and Parchomovsky
propose the use of a “Copyright T ru st” to deal w ith some of the
thorny issues posed by creative collaborations. The tru s t m echanism
would allow a court to separate ownership and control of copy
righted m aterial.292 The beneficial owners of the copyright would be
determ ined based on contribution, while a tru stee would be
appointed to exercise complete control over the copyright.293 One
m ight think of this as forced (or default) firm ownership. The court
can create a firm and impose a m anager a t the top of the hierarchy.
This proposal could be viewed as sim ilar to the fiduciary relation
ship th a t the A ustralian court imposed in B u lu n B ulun.294
Bell and Parchomovsky note th at, while th eir analysis addresses
theoretical problems sim ilar to those addressed in our analysis of
formal law and collaboration, th e ir solution “may be viewed as
antithetical to those espoused by Casey and Sawicki.”295 We agree

289. See supra Part IV.A.
290. Similar community collaboration phenomena may arise in the context of new Western
media that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Shun-Ling Chen, Collaborative
Authorship: From Folklore to the Wikiborg, 2011 U. III. J.L. T ech . & P olY 131, 157-65; cf.
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369,
371-74 (2002).
291. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 55, at 1023-25 (citing and critiquing Casey &
Sawicki, supra note 30).
292. See id. at 1020, 1054-59.
293. See id. at 1055.
294. While the Bulun Bulun court did not create a constructive trust, a fiduciary duty, of
course, has many of the trappings of a trust relationship. See Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles
Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 244, 262 (Austl.).
295. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 55, at 1055.
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with that characterization, and our analysis here of informal law
widens the gap.
In a world of pure formal law, we see little to object to in the
Copyright Trust proposal. But the framework of informal law and
nonhierarchical governance we have described in this Article
renders a Copyright Trust proposal either destructive of collabora
tive creation or impossible to implement. Informal law can create a
governance or control structure without contract and without
integration. It allows for adaptive governance rules to evolve in
response to the diverse production inputs and roles that might be
necessary for creative collaboration.
A court imposing a Copyright Trust could destroy that governance
system. Imagine a court attempting to allocate control of the trust
to one person. Bell and Parchomovsky suggest that parties can
contract around this if it is undesirable . 296 But they do not address
informal, noncontractual solutions. If the only opt out is formal
contracting, then that would essentially destroy the role of informal
rules altogether.297 Like the outcome in Bulun Bulun, this structure
favors rigid formal mechanisms over the flexible informal ones
developed by the creative communities themselves.
In cases like Merkin, the Copyright Trust concept would produce
strange results where control is wrested from those intended and
understood to possess it by long standing norms and placed in the
hands of a trustee who must then decide what to do to benefit the
interests of all contributors (however broadly the notion of “contribu
tors” is defined). If that power were actually exercised, it could have
major adverse effects on the creative collaboration. Either every
party would have to negotiate formal control agreements or colla
borations would cease.
On the other hand, for the same reason that producers do not
exercise final cut privileges, the trust structure will probably have
no impact at all. Informal rules are too powerful. The court might
296. See id. at 1060 (“[Njothing in our proposal denies creators the opportunity to
determine their respective rights contractually.”).
297. See id. at 1059-60. A similar concern in Bulun Bulun was that creating a property
right owned in constructive trust for the Ganalbingu people would hinder rather than enhance
communal creativity by placing the control outside of the communal norms. See Bulun Bulun,
86 FCR at 258-60. It is not clear that the Bulun Bulun court avoided this problem when it
created a fiduciary relationship.
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allocate control to one trustee, but th a t control will diffuse back out
to the community. And contributors would be wary to involve a
court for fear of exclusion from future projects in the industry.298
This is why we say the T rust m ight be impossible to implement.

D. Crowding Out and the Cliff of Formal Law
A final observation about the interaction of formal and informal
law: formal intellectual property law is generally more one-size-fitsall th a n inform al rules, which are created and enforced by the
community to which they apply.299 Inform al rules m ight then be
b etter suited to facilitating diverse approaches to creative collabora
tion.
For example, consider a chef who is deciding w hether to collabo
ra te on a recipe. If we protect rights in recipes the way we protect
literatu re—assigning rights in the “fixed” output to someone labeled
an “author”—we m ight see less collaboration.300 Assume th a t the
law provided solid protection once a recipe was w ritten down. In
developing a recipe, a chef m ight not w ant to let anyone else know
her thoughts until she is ready to transform it into th a t w ritten
form of expression.301 Pre-expression collaboration underm ines
protection because it provides others w ith access to ideas before
those ideas are protected by law (just as coauthoring a novel does).
The chef in such a world m ight instead decide to produce new
recipes as a sole creator and shun collaborative efforts because
collaboration exposes h er to the risk th a t h er collaborators will
m isappropriate her ideas.
298. One might alternatively take this analysis to suggest that the courts’ decisions in the
high-profile cases discussed above are unlikely to have major impact. See supra Part IV.A.
The norms will in most cases control. The result is that we need not worry too much about the
judicial errors. But we should still worry that we have little real understanding about what
is going on in the space regulated by copyright law.
299. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1840-41 (making a similar argument with
respect to stand-up comedy); Perzanowski, supra note 9, at 585-87 (arguing that norms may
be more responsive than formal copyright law to the incentives required to produce creative
work in the tattoo industry); see also Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of
Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 Am . U. L. R ev . 845, 856-57 (2006) (describing
the uniformity cost of copyright law).
300. See Buccafusco, supra note 9, at 1150-52.
301. Id. at 1131-32 (arguing that a dish would satisfy copyright’s fixation requirement once
it has been cooked and the recipe written down).
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Somewhat counterintuitively, in a world with weaker formal
protection for recipes, the (relative) cost of pre-expression collabora
tion may be much lower. Once a dish is cooked anyone can copy it.
The chef is just as vulnerable to the theft of the final recipe as to
idea inputs into the recipe. To be sure, the chefs may not innovate
at all if there is no protection. But informal rules have developed to
provide that protection. And in contrast to formal protection of a
final recipe that begins only when the recipe is complete, norms
enforced through reputation have no cliff effect (or at least a
plausibly less dramatic cliff effect because the content and enforce
ment of the informal rules is fuzzier than that of the formal law)
and are as likely to protect against input idea theft as to final recipe
theft. In this way, formal law that imposes protections may alter the
foundation of collaborative organization in complex, and perhaps
unpredictable, ways.
C o n c l u s io n

Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the influence of informal
rules on the production of creative work is far more significant than
currently supposed. The conventional wisdom focuses on informal
rules that maintain incentives to create in areas where copyright
law is weak or nonexistent, like cuisine, stand-up comedy, tattoos,
and magic. But the reality is that informal rules influence all areas
of creative activity where there is collaboration—that is, all areas of
creative activity. So even when copyright law provides powerful
incentives, as it does in film, music, and literature, informal rules
have an important impact through their regulation of the collabora
tion required to produce movies and songs and books. This signifi
cantly increases the scope and nature of informal rules’ influence in
creative work.
Much, of course, remains to be done. We have only begun to
outline here the many potential interactions between formal law
and informal rules with respect to collaboration. Our hypotheses
should be rigorously tested with significant industry-specific
exploration of creative work. This Article provides a framework for
thinking about informal rules throughout the creative industries.
Future work should build on that framework so that scholars and
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policymakers can obtain a more accurate understanding of copyright
law, creativity, and collaboration.
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